Cicero On Duties, Episode 26 - Why Social Virtues Are Superior

Episode 26 July 01, 2026 00:40:21
Cicero On Duties, Episode 26 - Why Social Virtues Are Superior
Cicero On Duties
Cicero On Duties, Episode 26 - Why Social Virtues Are Superior

Jul 01 2026 | 00:40:21

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Show Notes

Cicero compares Justice to Wisdom, Greatness of Spirit, and Modesty. With hosts Chris Anadale, Katherine Bradshaw, Ethan Alexander-Davey, and Ben Peterson.
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IN THIS EPISODE
Book 1, Chapters 154-161
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INDEX
0:00 Introduction to Episode 26
1:13 Book 1 Ch 154-155, Cicero's Conclusions about Justice
8:12 Book 1 Ch 155-156, Benefactors
16:38 Book 1 Ch 157-158, Superiority of Social Virtue
25:46 Book 1 Ch 159, Modesty Still Trumps
32:10 Book 1 Ch 160-161, Conclusions about Being Honorable
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MENTIONED IN THIS EPISODE
CS Lewis, "Learning in Wartime." https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Lyp9GcHj67VLTHpWtZ6aGk6Hpvf8JAIa/view

Cary Nederman, The Bonds of Humanity. https://www.amazon.com/Bonds-Humanity-Legacies-European-Political/dp/0271085002


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HOSTS
Christopher Anadale is podcast editor for the Ciceronian Society, and Associate Professor of Philosophy at Mount St. Mary's University in Emmitsburg, Maryland.

Katherine L. Bradshaw is a Latin and Greek Fellow with the Ancient Language Institute and a Ph.D. student in Humanities through Faulkner University. She has an M.A. in Classics from the University of Maryland and an M.A. in English from the George Washington University.

Ethan Alexander-Davey is associate professor of political science at Campbell University, where he teaches all the courses on political theory and constitutional law. He is co-editor, with Richard Avramenko, of Aristocratic Souls in Democratic Times, and Aristocratic Voices: Forgotten Arguments about Virtue Authority and Inequality, both published by Lexington Books.

Ben Peterson is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Abilene Christianity University, where his research and teaching focus on political theory. He writes about constitutional theory & the institutional implications of differing philosophical and religious foundations. He teaches courses on American government and politics, political science methodology, and political theory, and also contributes essays to publications for a broad audience about public affairs.

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TEXTS
Translation we read from: https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/politics-international-relations/texts-political-thought/cicero-duties?format=PB&isbn=9780521348355

Another (free) translation: https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/cicero-on-moral-duties-de-officiis

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The Ciceronian Society encourages and equips Christian Scholars as they serve the church. To learn more, visit https://ciceroniansociety.org/

Check out our other Podcast, THE SOWER: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL1B7f66VCvfZnkwh_UjXjhXEg5P8dUq0q

Music: No. 4 Piano Journey, by Esther Abrami

#cicero #philosophy #ethics

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Episode Transcript

[00:00:00] Speaker A: Foreign. [00:00:10] Speaker B: Hello, welcome back to the Cicero On Duties podcast. Reading through all of De officiis with the scholars of the Cicerone Society. I'm Chris Anadale. Joining me today are my co hosts Ethan Alexander Davy, Catherine Bradshaw and Ben Peterson. We are going to finish today this episode with the end of book one of On Duties. We're going to begin with chapter 154 and read through the end, chapter 161. We are in the middle of Cicero's comparison of the different virtues with each other. We've just come to the point where he has stated with an argument that he believes that the virtues of sociability, including justice and beneficence, are in some way superior to the virtues of learning and of wisdom. Is going to pick up from that point. Ben, May I ask you to read first, I'd like to ask you to read all of chapter 154 and the first part of chapter 155 to the end of the paragraph. And Catherine, please begin with the comments. [00:01:12] Speaker C: Certainly any good man will agree that and will show it in practice. Sorry, excuse me. Will agree with that and will show it in practice. For there is no one, surely, however greedy he is to examine and understand the nature of things, who, though contemplating in his studies the highest objects of learning, would not cast them all aside. If his country were suddenly and critically endangered and he could come to its aid or relief, would he not do so even if he thought he could number the stars or measure the size of the earth? And he would do the same if the interests or safety of a parent or friend were at stake? From all this we realize that the duties of justice and must be given precedence over the pursuit of knowledge and the duties imposed by that. For the former, look to the benefit of mankind, and a man should hold nothing more sacred than that. [00:02:07] Speaker D: Catherine well, there's we continue with the elevation of the practical over the the contemplative or speculative. But on a practical level at this point, because he says, let's take a good man and say that something came up and he's in the middle of his particular thing, it doesn't matter how important that contemplative work is going to be, he's going to drop it and go to the assistance of someone else. So there's a concern for others. There's an importance on the sociable virtues, as we've pointed out in previous discussions, which is quite it makes sense, it's commonsensical, it sounds obvious to us. But I think there is a tradition that he's going against here a bit where I would say a misreading of Aristotle could be taken as an excuse to. To prefer the counting of the stars or something to the actual everyday help of an individual on the ground. So I think Cicero is combating this misreading through that thought experiment. [00:03:37] Speaker B: ETHAN [00:03:40] Speaker A: oh, but I. So yeah, we visited this topic before the previous paragraph. I think I like the way Catherine's put it that perhaps that view he's describing here of someone who would prefer to measure the stars while his country is on fire is perhaps a misreading of Aristotle. And perhaps what Aristotle was up to in the ethics was to try to encourage people who did not give enough respect to learning to show it more regard so that they would bring into in their service to their country. They would also approach that service with knowledge of things human and divine so that they could better serve their country. In this paragraph we have the more obvious scenario where if your country is being attacked or if your neighbor needs help, he will put down your book and perform the services that are required by sociability. But that doesn't mean, of course, that we have. We should not, when we are able, learn about things human and divine so that we can better serve our neighbors and our country. [00:04:53] Speaker D: Right? [00:04:54] Speaker B: I might put it this way, wisdom within the framework of justice, not vice versa. You want to be a just man who is as wise as he can be, not a wise man who does justice as much as he absolutely must in order to continue being wise. And that goes back to his criticism of the Platonic philosopher king, who in a sense has to be compelled to. To rule, to contribute to the life of the state. He says, well, good things are better done freely. If we reach back to that chapter, I'll just note, I think, the great final line of the reading here from chapter 155, the former looks to the benefit of mankind. A man should hold nothing more sacred than that to benefit the human race, to benefit your society, to benefit your fellow man. That should be the supreme interest to which everything else should be subordinated in the life of a truly excellent, superlative human being. BEN [00:05:50] Speaker C: so one kind of, one kind of comment along these lines and then. And then one tangential comment. Chris in a pre. In the previous episode, when we were talking about the. The previous chapters mentioned a kind of dissatisfaction with some of the thought experiments that, that. Or one of the thought experiments along these lines that Cicero is making. And I don't know if this was your thinking, Chris, but I mean, it. It does strike me as Kind of a question begging example, right. It says, well, of course, no philosopher would ever do, you know, whatever, refused to come to the aid and would prioritize, you know, the parent, the country if they were in peril. But it doesn't actually say, you know, it's not a logical argument, right. It's kind of like, well, no one would ever do this, right? Of course not, because it's common sense. And, and so you could actually. And here this will lead into my kind of tangential comment. Not, not strictly exegetical, but it does remind me of C.S. lewis's reflection on this very issue on, I think it's called On Learning in Wartime. I think it was a lecture he gave on Learning in Wartime. And it's kind of like he's kind of defending, even in like, extremist situations of extremists, right, that there is a, you know, it is justified, in fact, to spend time just learning and contemplating even when our country is directly under attack, you know, and he's saying, well, no, it doesn't mean all of life stops, right? You still have to preserve those things that are important. And so, I don't know, you could kind of go the other way. It does seem like these are things that have to be held in tension with each other, right? Your country, your family, the church. If you're a Christian, you owe something to them, right? You owe maybe a lot more than we typically give to those things. But at the same time, there are also things like the pursuit of knowledge, the pursuit of wisdom, contemplating the true, the good and the beautiful that we wouldn't want to sacrifice completely and, you know, in order to save the country. So it's just an interesting tension, I think, that has to be held. And he doesn't quite offer a detailed argumentation here, although there is some thrust to what he's saying. [00:07:55] Speaker B: Very, very good. Well, let's pick up in the middle of chapter 155. Catherine, would you please pick up where Ben left off? But note that those. And read the rest of 155 and all of 156 and Ethan, lead comment, certainly. [00:08:12] Speaker D: But note that those who have devoted their entire life to learning things have, after all, managed to contribute to the benefits and advantages of mankind. They have educated many to be better citizens and more beneficial to their countries. So, for example, Lysis, the Pythagorean taught the Theban, Epaminondas, Plato taught Dion of Syracuse, and there are many similar cases. I myself, whatever assistance I have given the Republic, if I have indeed Given any came to public life trained and equipped by my teachers and their teachings. Not only when they were alive and present do such men educate and instruct their assiduous students. They continue the same task after their death by means of their writings, which they leave as memorials. There is no theme relevant to the laws of our country, to its customs, to its education, that they have overlooked. They seem to have devoted their leisure to our business. The very men, then, who have given their lives to the pursuit of teaching and wisdom provide above all, good sense and understanding for the benefit of mankind. Therefore, it is better to speak at length, provided one does so wisely, than to think, however penetratingly, with. Without eloquence. For speculation turns in on itself. But eloquence embraces those to whom we are joined by social life. [00:09:33] Speaker A: I'm GLAD Ben mentioned C.S. lewis's essay on learning during wartime. I was thinking about it and I didn't mention it, but I'm glad he did. And I'll mention it again here. I think it's especially relevant. Right. So there's this line in one of Lewis's other essays, the Abolition of Man, where he says, we laugh at honor and then we are shocked to discover traitors in our midst. Right. And so if men are going to serve their country, they have to learn the virtues, including courage and service and self sacrifice. And it is the teachers who are are going to teach the young men what the virtues are so that they can then go out into life and live them. And so. Right. So there's never a time when learning is not important. And perhaps there's a division of labor. There are those who teach the virtues, and they must continue to do that so that those who are engaged in active service are properly instructed and inspired. [00:10:48] Speaker B: Yeah. And I'll add here that I think maybe we see Cicero constructing a kind of Roman alternative to the Platonic philosopher king in the figure who. The very men who have given their lives to the pursuit of teaching and wisdom. Notice not just wisdom, but also teaching, which is a public act, an act of obligation, of sociability towards one's fellows and towards the state, by raising up one's fellow citizens, provide good sense, prudentia and understanding to benefit mankind. And his wrap up here, it is better to speak at length wisely than to think without eloquence. So I leave it to you, he says, this is very oratorical, very political. Speculation will turn in on itself. But eloquence embraces our fellow man. Again, another great sort of turn of phrase. And Image to remind us that our primary focus should be outward, should be towards being wise while being just, and not any other combination that sort of privileges the inner life and the private, the speculative, over what is gonna be done here in the world. I sometimes try to tell my high schoolers that the way to think about Cicero is he's a philosopher. The Romans are trying to be philosophers while also running an empire. So they don't have the luxury of constructing artificial ideal states and teaching you all about those. We've got an empire to run. Or I should say, a republic for Cicero. Sorry, A republic to run. An imperium. Ben? [00:12:27] Speaker C: Yeah, One thing, I think there's a parallel passage in 1 Corinthians. St. Paul is saying, I would rather speak five intelligible words than then many, many words, kind of in a kind of spiritual state of ecstasy. That might be great for the particular speaker in that situation, but it doesn't build the church up. And here. Yeah, it's like, great if you can think penetrating thoughts and you can just really, really deeply contemplate the nature of things, but eloquence speak. I think he's there, including speaking and writing, because he mentioned the writing. People who love writings as memorials of their teaching that benefits others. Right. And so it builds society up and contributes to social life. And I do think it's something that, you know, we've hit around several times now, but it is a kind of. Both of these things are good things. But for Cicero. Yeah, The. The purpose. And it does seem like for a certain philosophical. From a certain philosophical vantage point, the contemplation itself is the goal. Right. It. You know, truth seeking is its own reward, so to speak. And I'm. I'm not. I don't know if Cicero would outright say that's not a reward, but again, push comes to shove, if you have to give that up for the good of the community, versus, as you said, I think a few times, Chris, you know, the idea of pursuing wisdom and understanding, but it's for the benefit of building up society and pursuing justice and sociability and all these things. For Cicero. [00:14:04] Speaker D: Yeah. And there's. There's a sense, Ben, where I. I think. I think you're hitting a particularly important point for Cicero, that it's not. That it's not. The contemplation is worthless. It has its own worth. It has its own rewards. But virtue consists in action, as he says in an earlier section. And so for him, in order to kind of rise to the level of virtue, I think it has to be put into practice. So in the tradition of James More, in the. Well, you show me your faith without your works. Well, let me show you my faith by my works. And so I think that idea, while it's not sanctified yet, is still in its sort of natural state. With Cicero, and he knows the, the importance of teachings. I mean, he says, I came to public life trained and equipped by my teachers and my teachings. And he has a whole other oration in which he very famously acknowledges his debt to one of his teachers. It's called the Pro archia Poeta, and it's defending one of his grammar school era teachers who is in a citizenship case issue. It's also famous because it's this big, long defense of the liberal arts from, from Cicero. And he's, he's entering this conversation in which there's a, a long tradition. I mean, those of us who are, who are in the great books world, which would be all of us in this zoom room, there's that, that trope of, well, we're talking with authors and I have so many friends. Many of them are dead and I only know them through their writings, but they are still my friends. Here's Cicero contributing to that tradition and saying that the authors contribute after their deaths. And here again, he's going against Plato because Plato says you shouldn't write anything down. So there's a lot of little threads here that are all kind of being brought together in this paragraph. [00:16:26] Speaker B: Great. Well, next I'd like to tackle chapters 157 and 158 together. Ethan, would you please read those and I'll start us with commenting. [00:16:39] Speaker A: Now, it is not in order to make honeycombs that swarms of bees gather together, but it is because they are gregarious by nature that they make honeycombs in the same way, but to a much greater extent. Men living naturally in groups, exercise their ingenuity in action and in reflection. Therefore, unless learning is accompanied by the virtue that consists in protecting men, that is to say, in the fellowship of the human race, it would seem solitary and barren. In the same way, if greatness of spirit were detached from sociability and from the bonding between humans, it would become a kind of brutal savagery. And so it turns out that the bonds between and the sociability of men take precedence over any devotion to learning. It is not true, as some claim, that men embarked upon communal life and fellowship in order to provide for life's necessities. Just because we could not manage without others to provide ourselves with our Natural requirements. In that case, if everything needed for sustenance and comfort were provided by a magic wand, so to speak, then any talented man would drop all his business and immerse himself completely in learning and knowledge. But it would not be like that. He would flee from loneliness, seeking a companion for his studies. He would want both to learn and to teach, both to listen and to speak. Therefore, every duty whose effect lies in preserving the bonding between men and their fellowship must be preferred to the duty that is limited to learning and knowledge. [00:18:17] Speaker B: Very good. Thank you, Ethan. I think here we have two more chapters in praise of the excellence of the virtues of sociability, Their superiority to all the others. Or I might say, if it's not merely a matter of ranking, there being the kind of outside context in which the other virtues will be be integrated and practiced. So that when we look at the sort of fundamental structure, the sort of outside is the image. I use virtue of our lives. It has to be a virtue that takes account of the bonds of sociability between us. We take our social nature seriously. And so we say to be wise, to be excellent, to excel in learning, is to do so with a proper respect for the bonds of fellowship to mankind. And I think both chapters make this point, each in their own way. The idea that this natural origin of society, the sort of social, material origin of the social contract, we couldn't produce as many things for ourselves as we would like, and so we cooperate. I think he's quite right in saying that this misses the point that. I'm sorry, my last comment here. I'll just say that we might consider the case of somebody who suddenly finds that all of his money needs are met. What does he do? Well, he seeks some way of continuing to be integrated into the social life of his community. Because to simply immerse yourself in your books is not natural and is not virtuous. Ben? [00:19:53] Speaker C: Yeah, I think this is a really striking sort of declaration about the gregariousness of humankind. And it's interesting that he uses the bees as the example. Except he says even more so, right? Human beings are even more social, even more drawn to each other simply by our nature and not merely in a functional sense. Right. This second158 struck me as very relevant to the sort of debates we're having in the age of AI because it's saying, hey, if you had a magic wand that you could make things more efficient, you could do things without other people, then everybody would do it. Once again, you have a little bit of a thought Experiment kind of argument, you know, of course, nobody would do that, but he skills some bases there. But it is still, I think the point he's making is very interesting to say no, a lot of the things that we do socially are not because it's more efficient that way, although it may be that there are benefits to be had from the ways we coordinate and organize our societies. The sociability itself, the bonds between us themselves are again, a good in their own right. And in fact for him is something like the chief good or the good to which all the other goods are attached, or something like that. I will just mention there's a book by my PhD advisor I didn't write on Cicero, but my PhD advisor, Kerry Netterman, political scientist at Texas A and M University, wrote a book on the reception of Cicero in medieval society. And I think it's called the Bonds of Humanity. And it just focuses on this notion of Cicero working through the different kinds of bonds we have with different people, the kinds of duties that they suggest, and all these kinds of things. So it's a really rich theme within Cicero's work, and this is a really nice statement of it. [00:21:47] Speaker D: Yeah, Ben. I was also drawn to the be analogy. There's an not allegorical, agricultural. That's the word. I wanted an agricultural treatise by Varro in Latin where he talks about various, you know, bees and other things, because the Romans consider apiculture part of agriculture. And so Varro says bees are not solitary like eagles, but like human beings. They are not of a salt. They, they are gregarious. They are social creatures. And so it's sort of the reverse of Cicero here, because Varro's talking about actual animals. But there is a way in which the ancients kind of go to bees naturally, as. Let's talk about society. Oh, let us now talk about bees and draw the. Draw the analogy from bees, because they are a society in which all these little units come together to create this very impressive whole with all these wax cells that are perfectly aligned. So there is a sense in which that's very appealing for the Romans in general. And then for Cicero, as he's talking about each of these things, there is a way in which that hunger for community, when he does the thought experiment with the solving everything by a magic wand, I think that that does speak to our era, not just in the realm of AI, but also in the realm of isolation, because, you know, post lockdown, we're all dealing with the effects of prolonged isolation in adults and. And young people. So even the people who Even those who are very into kind of isolating hobbies, video games, for instance, they seek a feeling of community, even if it's not a real flesh and blood community. There's the chats and the other characters in the video game and things like that. So there is that hunger for community, even if it's expressed in ways that are actually not very social. [00:24:05] Speaker A: So everything that's been said so far is sufficient. But I'll add two references to the conversation. So man does not live by bread alone. We all know that line. And you can think of that in terms of the bees and their honeycomb. The honey is their food so that they can live a gregarious life together, because that is their nature. It is the means by which they are able to sustain themselves, but is not the purpose of their joining together. And also, I was thinking of this in terms of Aristotle's discussion of friendship in the Ethics, right? So we do not join together merely for friendships of utility, right? To supply each other with the things that we need, but we come together. Friendship is also. There are friendships of pleasure. It is pleasant to be with other people, usually. And there are also friendships of virtue. We seek to study and to discourse together so that we can share those virtues with other people. And if we only possess virtue in isolation, we are not fulfilling it. So society exists for these larger social purposes that go beyond the narrow focus on utility. Great. [00:25:31] Speaker B: Thank you, Ethan. I think we've got two more rounds, I think, before we're finished with this book and with this episode. I will read chapter 159, which is rather short. We'll just go around quickly with comments on that. Ben going first, and then we'll finish the. Finish the book. It should perhaps be asked whether this sociability, which conforms so greatly to nature, should always be given precedence, even over moderation and modesty. I do not think so. For some things are so disgraceful or so outrageous that a wise man would not do them even to protect his country. Posidonius has collected many such examples, but some are so repellent, so disgusting, that it seems dishonorable even to mention them. And so a wise man will not undertake such things for the sake of the Republic, and indeed the republic will not want him to undertake them for its sake. But in fact, it turns out conveniently that a situation could not arise where it would benefit the republic for such a man to perform any. Any such deed. [00:26:38] Speaker C: That's a very interesting passage here, because it. It does seem to kind of. Kind of walk back a Little bit. Not directly, but it seems to kind of push a little bit against what he has been saying about privileging, you know, service to the country and to humankind and society. Above, certainly above, sort of mere learning or mere wisdom. Right. But at the same time it is saying, well, but they're not without limits, right? Not, not. No, there's no, there are acts that are so indecent and, and so humiliating perhaps that they, they shouldn't. Luckily they don't come up that often or they will never come up. Right. But it is interesting. I'm not sure exactly what he, what he has in mind, although I might just suggest he might even say, well, by doing these kinds of acts you are offending sociability. Right. Because this is one of the ways we understand seemliness and the right degrees of moderation and things is by how people react to our presence, our behaviors and things like that. So I wonder if we could kind of try to reconcile what he's saying here a little bit. [00:27:45] Speaker A: Catherine. [00:27:46] Speaker D: There's also the fact that here he's speaking of a wise man will not undertake such things, but also the republic will not want him to undertake them. There's, there's a level of care and there's a level of limit for the republic that there are certain things that a country should not ask of its citizens. And I think, I think these would, these would be the things that we would, we would, to use an old fashioned term, that would constitute moral turpitude for the sake of the country. And there it's. If a republic, I think for Cicero, if a republic asks this of a citizen, then the republic no longer has the prerogative to claim loyalty from the person because it's sunk to a level at which it is no longer the source of officium if it is asking such things. [00:29:03] Speaker A: This is one of those passages which I'd forgotten about. But it reminds me that for a long time in Western civilization, this book on duties represented the standard, the starting point of discussions about morality, which is later challenged by Machiavelli. So again, for Cicero, there are limits to what you should do for the sake of your country, to preserve your government and your society. There are things that are so disgraceful, so outrageous that you should not do them even to save your country. Machiavelli would say the opposite, right? You can do the most immoral thing if it leads to the right result. And for Machiavelli, saving the state is always the result that you want to pursue. So this is right, I think it's important that we have in Cicero this reminder that although saving the state, saving your country is your first duty, there are things that are, there are limits, right? One should not try to save one's country through the most wicked acts or the most unjust acts, because we are still bound to be just. And that is a, that is a claim that, well, not all moderns, starting with Machiavelli, accepted. [00:30:39] Speaker B: I'll just add my two brief thoughts to this one. Since we've been in the territory of thought experiments, what if this, what if that. Excuse me, this seems like perhaps this is Cicero's anticipatory reply to Somebody says, yeah, well, what about what if to save the state you had to do such and such horribly degrading action? And he's saying, look, prudence here, above all things, what is fitting, what is appropriate, and some things plainly go beyond the line. Although the wise man would drop his studies to defend the state, he wouldn't go defend the state, and wouldn't be expected to defend the state by doing certain kinds of unnamable things. My second comment, the example that comes to me here, that might be historical Socrates perhaps insisting at his trial that he won't debase himself by bringing his wife and children to plead to win acquittal with tears. That's not quite the same thing as defending the state, but it indicates there's a certain. I called it seemliness before, but maybe we could say also it's a matter of this kind of action which simply ought not to be done and so won't be done. Perhaps now thinking about Socrates and the outcome of his trial, that's not a civic issue, that's not a matter of the state, but more of the outcome of a private person. So perhaps I should take that one back or qualify it. So we have just chapters 160 and 161. Ben, I'd like you to read those and Catherine, lead off comments that'll bring us to the end of book one of On Duties. [00:32:09] Speaker A: All right. [00:32:10] Speaker C: Let the following then be regarded as settled when choosing between duties, the chief place is accorded to the class of duties grounded in human fellowship. Moreover, since well considered action will be the consequence of learning and good sense, acting with forethought is in fact more worthwhile than merely thinking sensibly. So much for that subject. The topic has now been explained so that it should not be difficult for anyone asking a question about duties to see which should take precedence over another. Further, there are degrees of duties within social life itself. Consequently, we can understand which takes precedence over which that duties are owed, first to the immortal gods, secondly to one's country, thirdly to one's parents, and then down the scale to others. From this brief discussion, you may realize that men are often uncertain not only over whether something is honorable or dishonorable, but also over which is the more honorable of two honorable possibilities. Panaetius passed over this theme, as I said above. But now let us go on to the questions that still remain. [00:33:21] Speaker D: Well, here we are with the. The summation paragraphs as, as we come to our oratorical conclusion of the book. [00:33:31] Speaker A: The. [00:33:33] Speaker D: The thing that stands out to me here is, is that Cicero is very conscious of the reality of when duties or officia in Latin contradict or conflict, and we have to choose between them. I think that there is a sense when he's going through these things, of. There's a feeling almost of, oh, well, this is sort of in the. Not, not in the ideal setting, but in a setting where there's not conflict. Because if you include conflict, it's going to be complicating matters. So the first book he's been laying out, these are the virtues, these are the proper things to do, etc. And now he's saying, okay, we've established the hierarchy. It's immortals, then parent, then country, then parents, then other people. So we have the, to borrow a term from St. Augustine, Order of loves. But we are about to get into what if they conflict. And so he's setting up nicely for next book. [00:34:45] Speaker A: So my turn. So my one comment about this passage is. I see the list here. First to the immortal God, secondly to one's country, thirdly to one's parents. And then on the scale, I thought that's not quite what he said before when he addressed this topic. And then it's confirmed in the notes that there's a slightly different hierarchy of our duties to different groups. And so that maybe suggests to us how difficult this whole enterprise is. First of all, we have to know where our first duty lies and be able to recognize it when we have a conflict, when we have. Have to choose about which one to serve first. And so it's a very difficult enterprise. And it seems that Cicero was working it out as he was composing this work as well. [00:35:45] Speaker B: Yeah, I'll make my comment about the very first paragraph of chapter 160. When choosing between duties, chief place is the class of duties granted in human fellowship. So justice and beneficence, sort of giving public sort of presence to your justice and your Just judgment. And secondly, since considered action will follow from learning and good sense from prudence and wisdom, acting with forethought is more worthwhile than merely thinking sensibly. And again, that Roman preference for acting again, with forethought, I'm not quite sure what the Latin is here, but with sort of seeing ahead what the likely results are going to be of your action taking account of that and choosing, you know, wisely, prudently, correctly, within that widest possible scope will be better than simply thinking sensibly, thinking well, or having the sort of those same virtues merely kind of in potentia. So, Catherine, did you find the word I was looking for? Oh, you're muted. [00:36:58] Speaker D: So it's literally. It's to. To act considerate. So with. With consideration. [00:37:08] Speaker B: Consideration, okay. [00:37:09] Speaker D: Yeah. So it has to do with. With thought and looking. Thinking through what one has done or will do. [00:37:20] Speaker B: Thanks very much, Ben, your comment. [00:37:23] Speaker C: Well, and if I do recall that that was one of the key distinguishing markers that he places to. To distinguish human nature from other animals. Right. The ability to have forethought and think about consequences of actions. And so it sort of makes sense. He's kind of landing the plane here for this first book with. With that idea and as well as connecting it to what we've been talking about, of his giving priority to the virtues associated with serving human fellowship, fostering the bonds of humanity. Yeah, I mean, it is striking, the different, as Ethan was saying, the sort of different orderings. And my recollection is that in the earlier parts, where we've come to this idea of ordering the obligations and what to do when they conflict, is that he pays a lot of attention to circumstance. Right. And it. It may be that, I mean, you may owe your parents before you owe others, but what if your parents are engaged in something that's immoral or harmful? I mean, there's all the circumstance, or maybe somebody else has given you a great benefit that you need to pay them back for. [00:38:34] Speaker A: Right. [00:38:34] Speaker C: I mean, so there's all kinds of ways that the circumstances could affect the ordering. It seems to me that that was part of what we discussed earlier. But still, it is. It is striking that. It's interesting that Cicero seems to suggest that there is a kind of common sense that can be brought to these questions of duty and ethics. And he says, hey, if you sort of think about it, put yourself in some situations, you'll be able to see pretty easily if you think through the core principle that, you know, you ought to be serving human fellowship and you ought to be acting with these virtues in mind. You'll know what to do. Right? It's kind of an interesting point I just wanted to throw in while we were talking about sociability and some different things about that. The quote from Augustine in, I think it's book 12 of City of God. There's nothing so social by nature, so unsocial by its corruption as this race as the human race. Right. It's kind of just an interesting quote about that. [00:39:36] Speaker B: Fantastic. Well, we've done it, guys. This is episode 26. We've been at it for 26 weeks, but we've gotten through the end end of book one out of the three books of On Duties. We will pick up with next week with the beginning of book two on the beneficial and apologia for the practice of philosophy. So going back, sort of resetting and beginning a treatment of a new topic. I want to thank my three co hosts, Catherine, Ben and Ethan. I want to thank you for watching listening to this episode of On Duties. Please join us again next week for the beginning of book 2. Thanks for watching today. Goodbye.

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