Episode Transcript
[00:00:09] Chris Anadale: Hello and welcome back to the Cicero on Duties podcast, a production of the Ciceronian Society. We are reading through all of De Officiis with the scholars of the Ciceronean Society. I'm Chris Anadale and joining me today are my co hosts, Coyle Neal Ethan, Alexander Davy and Katherine Bradshaw.
We are at book two, chapter 16.
The topic for this episode will be virtue and fortune and Catherine. I'd like to ask you to start us off reading chapters 16 and 17. And Ethan, take first comment and we'll go counterclockwise around the circle.
[00:00:48] Katherine Bradshaw: I have dwelt longer on this point than is necessary, but is there anyone to whom the facts that Panaetius related at great length are not obvious? That no one, whether a general in war or a leading statesman at home, could have accomplished deeds of great service without the support of his fellow men? He recalls Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, and Alexander denying that their great achievements would have been possible without other men's cooperation. He calls unnecessary witnesses, although the matter is not in doubt.
On the other hand, just as we secure great benefits because men collaborate and agree, conversely there is no truly pernicious curse that is not brought upon man by man.
Dicaearchus, that great and prolific peripatetic, has written a book about the destruction of mankind. In this he gathers together the other causes of death, such as floods, epidemics, devastation, sudden stampedes of wild creatures, whose onslaught, as he teaches us, has. Has wiped out whole tribes of men. Then he shows by comparison how many more men have been destroyed by attacks by other men, that is, in war or uprisings, than in any other type of disaster.
Thus, there can be no doubt on this question that it is men who inflict on their fellow men both the greatest benefit and the greatest harm. Therefore, I count it as the special property of virtue to make its own the hearts of other men and to enlist them in its own service.
Consequently, whatever benefit to human life arises from inanimate things or from the use of management of animals is attributed to the manual arts. It is the wisdom and virtue of outstanding persons, however, that inspire other men to be prompt, ready, and devoted in assisting our advancement.
[00:02:36] Josh Bowman: Right? So he's setting up this. This discussion that's going to follow, which involves.
So first of all, we have the question about the great man. What can the great man accomplish without the cooperation of his fellows? And so, following from this discussion, we're going to see a fairly detailed disquisition on how the leader gets the cooperation of other sorts of people and Depending on what motivates them, he can seek their cooperation according to their various characters.
And then in the second paragraph here, well, starting with maybe the second part of the first paragraph, this reminds me a lot of Aristotle, the line from Aristotle's Politics where Aristotle says that when man is the greatest benefit to other men, when he is regulated by laws and by reason, but separated from those things, he is a curse, a scourge to other men. And so this understanding of the danger of human nature, human nature has to be cultivated. And we need virtue. We need virtue in order to make man useful to other men. Without virtue, man is a scourge to other men.
[00:04:08] Coyle Neal: Yeah, and I'd agree with the Aristotle reading on that.
[00:04:11] Chris Anadale: Right.
[00:04:12] Coyle Neal: This is the fact that man is the social animal. We all live together, and that has a good and a bad component. I think it's interesting in 16 where he points out that not only do we pursue virtue and pursue goodness and build society and so on together, but we also do terrible things together.
Yeah, we, we do require social life in order to have all of the nice things that we like, like enough food to eat and shelter over our heads, but it's also society that takes those things away and destroys them and tears down.
It's. Yeah, it's interesting. I, I don't often think to go to the negative with that, but Cicero is, is quite willing to do so.
[00:04:58] Chris Anadale: Yeah, I'd agree. And just emphasize, I think, double down on Ethan's point that really the master key to all of this is virtue. So we might say two points. One, the magnitude of the effect that social cooperation, or lack of it, has on our happiness, well being and the beneficial, which is the topic of book two, Man's role is vastly outsized in that. Right.
We saw previously in the previous episode, the care of animals, the extraction of minerals from the earth, all of that is human labor and human activity and human social cooperation.
So man is the greatest factor in man's happiness or misery, and virtue is the greatest factor in actually making sure that that human contribution to the beneficial and the useful is in the positive direction and not in the negative direction. So again, extending the thought with which the book two began, that's philosophy, the importance of philosophy for actually orienting us correctly towards even the very practical, useful and beneficial things of life. Catherine?
[00:06:08] Katherine Bradshaw: Yes, I would agree. I also think it's interesting that Cicero says this should be obvious to us and says who? I. I've already dwelt on this topic longer than was necessary because everybody knows this, and then proceeds to elaborate greatly upon this obvious quote, unquote thing.
And even going into the. The difference between natural disasters, things that happen to us that are not the work of man, and comparing that, but then also going beyond. And saying, okay, but this area, the use and management of animals, that's a manual art. But then you have.
Here's what is necessary for communal life, as you all were saying, is virtue. And so this should be obvious according to Cicero, and yet he's taking the time to explain it, which indicates. Well, of course it's not as obvious as it should be.
And this is what he's laying out for his son Marcus is.
This should be clear.
But I might as well remind you of it since you're in. In a situation where I think you need the encouragement.
[00:07:30] Chris Anadale: Very good. I think the next, next we'll turn to chapter 18, just chapter 18.
I think Ethan may ask you to read that. And Coyle lead off comment.
[00:07:43] Josh Bowman: Indeed, virtue as a whole may be said practically to depend upon three things.
One is perceiving what is true and clear in each case, what agrees with or what follows from what, what gives rise to each thing, and what is the cause of each thing. The second is restraining the disturbed movements of the spirit, which the Greeks call pathe, and making the impulses, which they call hormai, obedient to reason.
The third is treating those with whom we associate knowledgeably and with moderation in order that their support may secure for us the requirements of nature in full and ample measure, and that if any disadvantage threatens to afflict us, we may, through the same men averted and avenge ourselves on those who have attempted to harm us in inflicting such punishment as fairness and humanity allow.
[00:08:38] Coyle Neal: Yeah. So I'm really interested to hear what the three of you have to say about this because I don't know if I agree with this as a definition of virtue or not, but I think it's an interesting one, especially the point of. You understand the world around you. You sort of perceive what's going on, properly understand the world. Second, you exercise self control based on that understanding. And then third, interact with others in a way that reflect the proper understanding of the world that we've. We've gathered in that first point.
Yeah, I don't know. I.
I don't know that I have a better definition, but it is, it's not one that I'm sure I'm completely sold on, so I don't know that I have anything deep to add to it other than I think this is.
This is a Good starting point for a conversation. I'm not sure it's a good ending.
[00:09:29] Chris Anadale: Well, I'll take the chance to push this forward a little bit in a philosophical direction.
This does remind me of my experience just a few months ago teaching the four cardinal virtues to a class of high school students.
We begin with the idea that prudence is the foundation of all the virtues without which none of them. It's the soil out of which all the virtues grow. And I see a little bit of that here. With what do you need first? Well, virtue as a whole depends upon perceiving what is true and clear.
[00:10:00] Coyle Neal: Right.
[00:10:00] Chris Anadale: Perceiving it, the connections between them, including causal connections. This is obviously going to a lot of what we might think of as science or just having a realistic attitude towards an accurate knowledge of the world. If your vision is distorted, if you make false judgments, if you impute causality where there is no causality, everything else you do is going to be corrupted by that. And in a sense, this is the sort of foundation of prudence being what Pieper calls in tune with the world. I think Catherine, you quoted Pieper to that effect recently.
And then the second moderation, internal self control, internal discipline. You have to be willing to conform yourself to the reality, to quiet the spirit, to develop a certain kind of self control, to be a certain kind of subject within that reality.
And then third, treat people with justice. Right. So there's this, there's a sort of moving outward from grounded in reality, inward sort of self control, discipline, self knowledge and the philosophical spirit. And then sort of the outward, you know, bring that into your behavior, your public action and character with people, treat them knowledgeably, with moderation.
[00:11:16] Josh Bowman: Why?
[00:11:17] Chris Anadale: Well, we're talking about the useful and the beneficial. So. So that you can achieve the good things in life and they can help you to moder the bad things in life so you can treat people well and be treated well.
I thought it was interesting. I'll throw this for the rest of the commenters here, that he ends by talking about vengeance and punishment, which also are instruments of the state and of justice. So I've said quite a lot. So Catherine, what do you think?
[00:11:43] Katherine Bradshaw: Well, I appreciate that he has this three part definition and I think part of it is again, we're getting up to the as far as we can get without a little bit more divine light, shall we say?
Because this is correct. I mean, if we're going to put this in a biblical lens, then the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. What's that? That's the perception of reality as it is.
And then the internal of, okay, I have pathe. I have emotions and passions and things like that, but those cannot rule. Those have to be restrained. And then, well, again, here we have the Romans, let's go and actually do something. Virtue is not real virtue until we put it into practice, which is also a biblical concept of, you know, faith without works is dead. So I think that we're pretty close to. We're as close to a definition that's complete as we can be in this tradition.
And I think, Chris, what you were talking about with the punishment piece, this is something Cicero returns back to frequently in De Officiis, in on duties that because he's writing to someone in the leadership class, we have this magistrate view of things and that includes punishing. And so that needs to be restrained. Just like he said elsewhere, where anger must not be part of the judge's modus operandi, because if it is, then he won't be able to be like the laws. He has to be impartial, just like the laws.
[00:13:36] Josh Bowman: I agree with all of what you've said so far. I'll just chime in here on the point about vengeance here because, well, as some of you know, I've just come back from Paris where, I mean, some of the Catholic counter revolutionary thinkers were big on this point. Right. That part of justice is God's vengeance against the unjust. Right. And I think what Cicero says here at the end of this paragraph is consistent with that. That part of justice is avenging ourselves on those who have been unjust to us and have afflicted us, have afflicted the state. And so that is the appropriate response in those circumstances.
Very good.
[00:14:24] Chris Anadale: Thank you, Ethan. I think we will tackle next. Coyle may ask you to read chapters 19 and 20 together. And I'll take initial comment.
[00:14:36] Coyle Neal: Yeah.
Shortly I will discuss the methods by which we can acquire the ability to embrace and retrain the support of other men, retain the support of other men. But before that, I must briefly mention something else. Can anyone be unaware of the great power of fortune, which impels one in either direction towards success or towards adversity? Whenever we enjoy her prospering breezes, we are carried to the haven for which we long. When she blows in our face, we are wrecked.
To fortune again belongs such occasional mishaps as squalls, storms, shipwrecks, collapse of buildings and conflagrations which have inanimate causes, and then the blows, bites and attacks of animals. But these, as I said, are comparatively rare. Then, on the one hand, take the destruction of armies, three lately, and often on other occasions, many. And the downfall of generals, recently of an excellent and exceptional man. Take also that resentment from the masses which has often led to the exile, ruin or flight of deserving citizens.
Take, on the other hand, success, civil honors, military commands and victories, though all these are indeed subject to fortune, in neither case can they be affected without the resources and assiduous support of other men.
Now that the point has been understood, I must discuss how we can entice and arouse other men to support what is beneficial to us. If my lecture is over long, let it be compared with the greatness of the benefit in question, then perhaps it will seem all too brief.
[00:15:59] Chris Anadale: Thank you, Coyle.
I think here we have a turn to fortune. But what about the role of luck? What about the role of the unpredictable?
Can anyone be unaware of the great power of fortune? And this, of course, connects this up, obviously in my mind with Boethius, a much later writer, whom I often will teach in the philosophy classroom, on the role of fortune and the way that the attitude you should take towards it. Cicero's approach here a little bit different because his approach seems to be to say, in neither case can these be effected without the resources and assiduous support of other men. Well, all the things even involving fortune and reaction to fortune are going to be brought up into this social reality in which we are helping or hindering each other. And so we've not really escaped from the need to give a careful consideration to virtue and society and the assistance or malevolence of assistance or the malice of our fellow human beings.
[00:17:14] Katherine Bradshaw: Yeah, and that's. I think, the surprising part of this section is just how intertwined those two concepts are for Cicero, because you have this very. It's. It goes forward to Boethius and. And aft and beyond to Chaucer. But there's also a long tradition that Cicero is drawing upon of talking about fortune and her.
Because fortune's, of course, a deity for the Romans as well as a.
An abstraction, shall we say.
But the things that one might consider just. Oh, well, that. That's just part of fortune, the. The rising of political office. I mean, Lucretius talks about this as something that one should not chase because it's just so unpredictable.
But Cicero points out, I mean, who's. Who's involved in the rise and fall of office. The people, the masses, the various changing of the whims of government bodies. I mean, all of those are made up of people. And so it is necessary to cultivate the goodwill of other men. And so he's starting to transition us from the topic now to the next topic and from the abstract, what we need to how we're going to get there.
[00:18:41] Josh Bowman: Right. So this is similar to what's already been said, but yeah, there's not much we can do in response to shipwrecks or conflagrations, those things that happen. But when it comes to the action of the masses or the action of enemies in politics, those are human beings who themselves are supported in their actions by other human beings. And so these are.
We could see these as elements or actions of fortune, but they're things over which we might have some influence if we understand how these enemies or opponents or masses are being incentivized to act in the way that they are. And so we can have some possible influence over those sorts of fortunes.
[00:19:37] Coyle Neal: Yeah, I think it's.
I don't think we can read this section and not think of Machiavelli talking about fortune also. Right.
Although the parallel difference, I guess, would be Machiavelli talks about it. If I'm remembering the prince correctly, his preparing for bad fortune is very much a psychological thing. It's something you kind of work yourself into. Whereas Cicero, this is a communal effort. Right. We, we prepare for bad fortune as a society, as a public, we are, we are together staring down the army coming at us or, or preparing for the. Maybe not the animal attack, but preparing for whatever's going to happen.
It's. It's an interesting passage to read, sort of in. In comparison, I'd want to think more about the putting them side by side. A Certainly read this. So I think that makes it interesting too.
[00:20:29] Chris Anadale: Yeah, I think we're certainly going to be talking more about Machiavelli next week in the episode where we come to talk about the role of fear.
But I want to wrap up this episode by reading chapters 21 and 22. I'll read those and Catherine, begin comment with you.
Insofar as men assist another in promoting his position or honor, they may do so either out of goodwill when for some reason they are fond of him, or for honor, if they look up to his virtue and consider him to be worthy of the most magnificent fortune, or because they have faith in him and judge that they are taking good care of their own interests, or because they fear his power, or on the other hand, if they have expectations of someone, as happens when kings or populares propose lavish distributions, or finally they are attracted by financial reward, that is the most sordid and impure of reasons, both for those who are held in its grip and for those who try to resort to it. For things are in a bad way when what ought to be achieved through virtue is attempted by means of money.
Since, however, there are times when such assistance is necessary, I shall talk about how it should be used. But first I shall discuss those matters that are closer to virtue.
There are a variety of reasons also why men submit themselves to the command or power of another.
For they may be attracted either by goodwill or by the greatness of his previous kind services, or because the man has a very high standing, or perhaps by the hope that such a choice will beneficial for them, or by fear that they may be compelled by force to obey, or else they may be won over by the hope or promise of lavish distributions. Or finally, as we often see in this republic of ours, they may be hired for pay.
[00:22:41] Katherine Bradshaw: Well, these two sections are quite full.
So the, the. The interesting thing is just in this, in this first section where he's talking about the, the. The list of ways that someone might be raised to public office or honor or dignity.
And again giving us a little peek into to what we'll talk about next week, he starts with goodwill. He doesn't start with gain. He doesn't start with fear. He doesn't start with respect even. He starts with goodwill that there's an affection for the person.
And then he goes to respect for virtue again. So for Cicero, it's interesting. I mean, he's just come off of getting out of public office, not by his own choice, because there was such a lack of virtue in the populace in Rome that we have a dictator who rises.
And yet Cicero holds out that it is possible for a man to rise to public office because he is so virtuous that the people respect him. Which is again, drawing from way back Roman tradition. You have people like Cincinnatus and those men who are held up as paragons of virtue. I mean, for us, George Washington would, Would be a parallel.
Then we get into the. The less and less noble motives, all the way down to the pecuniary. And then that is the, the. The sortidissima, the, the most literally dirty but the most squalid motivation according to Cicero.
[00:24:38] Josh Bowman: Yes, and for this, this passage for me echoes discussions in Xenophon. In Xenophon, Socratic dialogues, although Cicero's formulation is a little bit more developed here, but. Right. So for the statesman to get the cooperation of other people, he has to understand the character of these other people. And different people are motivated by different things. So some people of a more noble disposition will respond to kindness, will respond to being honored, and want to honor the person who honored them. And then we finally get down to the more slavish nature who responds only to monetary incentives, or even to, in Xenophon's case, and also in Cicero's here, even to fear and punishment as an incentive. So one has to know the character of the people whose cooperation one needs in order to appeal to them. And ultimately there need to be at least some number of men of a more noble disposition who will respond to the more noble appeals. If you are stuck with the sort of people who only respond to the most sordid incentives, you're probably lost. So. Right. Those are some of the reflections that occur to me here.
[00:26:08] Coyle Neal: Yeah. Well, I think two things on this. First, that last line is interesting where you can go to work for the noble statesman for pay.
If any of you know how to, if any of you know how to get that job, I'd be interested. You know, I'm on the market. What can I say?
Feel free to pass that along. Now, it does have to be the noble statesman, right? That, that's the important qualifier there. When we get into the next, next week, we, we may have other people who are also hiring that we should be less interested in.
I also also think this is an interesting passage that only really is going to apply to a free state, because if you are in a state where it's not free, then people follow the government because they have to. And there might be different motivations for doing it there also. But you're not trying to attract anyone, right? You're not trying to convince the people to get on board. You don't have to have, as the, the statesman, you don't have to have all these different motivations in mind and then try to get enough people behind you that you can put the policy in place that you want or make the, the changes that you want or attain the office that you want in, in the state, you've already got the office. And it's just a matter of lining people up and, and in the best case scenario, governing justly. But this is definitely a passage that is primarily going to be of use and interest to people who pick who they want to follow.
[00:27:37] Katherine Bradshaw: Right.
[00:27:37] Chris Anadale: Thank you. I. I think I, I'll just. Perhaps this is. Is too obvious to note, but my, my philosopher's antenna quivered here for a moment, noting that Cicero, both in the case of the positive and in the negative case, assigns motivations by just descending through the parts of the soul. Right. The sort of the noblest and best motivation. Well, people may out of goodwill or they are fond of him or for honor. Right. Because they look up to him, they admire his virtue or they may have faith in him, or they may that there's a little bit of self interest creeping in there, something a little bit less disinterested, less fully sort of rational and moral or perhaps out of fear or expectations of benefit. And then finally at the lowest, the sort of very, as you said, Katherine, the most sordid, just because they're being paid to do so. And that's the sort of most animalistic reason for assisting someone to promote a position of honor.
The linchpin of these two is right in the transition between the sentence that I marked myself for things are in a bad way when what ought to be achieved through virtue is attempted through means of money. Money is not a good substitute for virtue. And this may be if we're thinking about the American founding this summer of the 250th anniversary of 1776 to try to use some non virtue means of checks and balances. I'm thinking maybe I'm slandering Madison here to do what ought to be done by virtue. And having virtue throughout the Republic is a mistake in a bad way. Maybe I'm doing poorly to introduce such a topic here at the very end of our conversation. But same thing happens in the second paragraph in chapter 22 here.
There are a variety of reasons when submit themselves to commander power, goodwill or greatness, gratitude for past services. Those are rather noble in a higher part of the soul or because the man has high standing, something more thaumatic there sort of admiration or benefit or fear getting a little bit lower and lower. And then finally, of course, expectation of future pay or present pay. Again, the worst, the least least human, least noble and virtuous, the most opposed to virtue farthest from virtue in that sense.
That's my comment. Any final thoughts about these chapters before we wrap up this episode and go on?
[00:30:20] Josh Bowman: I think I was just going to add that Coyle made a very good point about how these reflections are especially relevant to a free people, to the republican Romans, and especially when we get into the next episode, we'll see more of these discussions about how a free people is not motivated by fear, but by these more noble sentiments. So this is right.
A free people is particularly amenable to these kinds of arguments.
[00:30:58] Chris Anadale: Very good. Thank you, Ethan. Well, that wraps us up for this week. For this episode of Cicero on Duties. I want to thank my co host, Catherine Bradshaw, Ethan Alexander Davy and Coyle Neal. Please join us next week for another episode. We'll get into Cicero's discussion of the role of fear and the ineffectiveness of fear. As we've been sort of hinting at here, there's going to be some obvious Machiavelli reference relevance in what's coming up. So thank you for joining us today.
[00:31:27] Coyle Neal: Goodbye.
