Episode Transcript
[00:00:09] Chris Anadale: Hello, welcome to another episode of the Cicero On Duties podcast. We are reading through all of De Officiis with a rotating cast of scholars from the Ciceronian Society. I'm Chris Anadale and joining me today are my co hosts Catherine Bradshaw and and Ethan Alexander Davy. If you enjoy our work and would like to spend time with us and like minded people, please consider attending our Spring 2027 conference in Virginia Beach, March 11th to 13th.
Registration is open now and discounted. Early bird Registration ends on January 1st. A link is in the description to this episode.
Today we continue reading through book three of On Duties where Cicero applies his rule of procedure to various hard cases, including stealing bread.
Ethan, would you please start us off by reading chapters 29 to 31?
[00:01:01] Ethan Alexander-Davey: Yes, but perhaps someone might object. Would not a wise man, if he is dying of hunger, steal food from another man if he could benefit no one?
Not at all. For my life is not more beneficial to me than to be so disposed in spirit that I would not do violence to anyone for my own advantage. What if a good man were to be able to rob of his clothes Phalaris, a cruel and monstrous tyrant, to prevent himself from dying of cold? Might he not do it? Such questions are very easy to decide. For if it is for your own benefit that you deprive even someone who is of no benefit whatsoever, you will have acted inhumanly and against the law of nature.
If, however, you are the kind of person who, if you were to remain alive, could bring great benefit to the political community and to human fellowship, and if, for that reason you deprive someone else of something that is not a matter for rebuke.
In situations that are not of that kind, however, each man should endure disadvantage to himself, rather than diminish the advantages that someone else enjoys.
Illness, want, or anything else of that sort are not, then, more contrary to nature than to take or to covet that which belongs to another, the neglect of the common benefit is, on the other hand, contrary to nature, for it is unjust.
Therefore the law of nature itself, which preserves and maintains that which is beneficial to men, will undoubtedly decree that the necessities of life should be transferred from an inactive and useless person to someone who is wise, good, and brave, who, if he were to die, would greatly detract from the common benefit. He must, however, do this in such a way that he does not, out of self esteem or self love, find a pretext for injustice. In this way he will always discharge his duty by having consideration for what is beneficial to mankind and to human fellowship Which I so frequently mention.
[00:03:10] Katherine Bradshaw: Well, now we get to the actual hard cases.
There's.
Although Cicero seems to think this is not a hard case because he says, you know, such questions are very easy to decide.
Oh, really? Cicero? They are?
Well, apparently they are for him. And again, I think it's. It's part of our modern dilemma that. That we tend to think, you know, oh, well, that's not an easy question. Well, I think that's more because we're moderns and have had a bunch of amoral advice given to us over the centuries in order to do that.
It is interesting, though, that Cicero does not just say no, though he does start with no, it is not all right to rob even a cruel and monstrous tyrant of anything.
It's why.
So it is for Cicero perfectly okay to take something from someone who is a detriment to society in order to preserve oneself. Not just to preserve oneself, but because one knows that one is useful to society. Then we get to the point where I go, okay, but where's the criteria for determining that, Cicero?
Because this is where I get antsy.
Where many, many, many very powerful factions and tyrants have. Have said very similar things and made judgments that are completely wrong based on criteria, that sounds a lot like this. But I think Cicero would say, well, but that would be contrary to nature, and that would be doing what I just said is a really bad thing to do. So he would want more moral consistency. Where I think us moderns, we have a little bit of a distrust of people's moral consistency.
[00:05:11] Chris Anadale: I think that Cicero certainly would have Caesar in mind here. I mean, Caesar would say, I've seized the property of the people. I've given it to somebody else. There was that spear that was planted in the marketplace to auction off goods as spoils of war.
He's spoken against that. But it does seem to me that this looks a little dodgy to us. We have an ideal of equality with an idea of sort of individual rights which are inalienable, which can't be taken away. And certainly property is pretty close to that if it's not absolutely that.
So when he says, yeah, you can take something away from somebody who's not contributing to the common good if you do it solely out of a sense of goodness and justice, to give it to yourself or someone else who will contribute to the common good.
I think what he's pointing out is that the purpose of politics is not to protect the natural rights of individuals as your kind of fundamental social political atoms. It's to serve the common good. And if the common good requires that this man live and not die or perish or suffer poverty, then if there's somebody else who can be deprived of that without harming the common good, that would be, as long as it's not selfish, which was the problem with Caesar's actions, then it's.
It's not unjust. In fact, it might even be required by justice, it seems to say. So I think we've got a big difference between the attitude towards the individual and the individual's rights at the foundation of political order. And what political order exists to serve, for Cicero? The common good, not the individual rights.
[00:06:41] Ethan Alexander-Davey: Yes, I think that's right.
The focus is on what serves the common good. That's what drives the decision. But I'm still a little concerned here about the criterion. Right. So the main criterion for the person, I may be able to do this as long as it is not out of self esteem or self love, which is a pretext.
And that seems to be the hardest part of all, as Catherine suggested. How many tyrants have told themselves, I'm not doing this out of self esteem or self love, I'm doing this for the common good, but have in fact been acting on precisely that motivation. So I think this is still a difficult case, even if it logically makes sense that the priority is to serve the common good. And so someone who is useless or harmful may need to suffer so that the common good may be served.
[00:07:47] Chris Anadale: Thank you, Catherine. Would you take us next into reading chapters 32 and 33 on. I'll take lead comment.
[00:07:55] Ethan Alexander-Davey: All right.
[00:07:57] Katherine Bradshaw: Now, it is very easy to make a judgment in the case of Faladas, for there can be no fellowship between us and tyrants. On the contrary, there is a complete estrangement. And it is not contrary to nature to rob a man, if you are able to whom it is honorable to kill.
Indeed, the whole pestilential and irreverent class ought to be expelled from the community of mankind. For just as some limbs are amputated, if they begin to lose their blood and their life, as it were, and are harming the other parts of the body. Similarly, if the wildness and monstrousness of a beast appears in human form, it must be removed from the common humanity, so to speak, of the body.
Of this sort are all those questions in which the issue is duty in particular circumstances. I believe, therefore, that Panaetius would have pursued questions of this kind had not some mischance or other preoccupation spoiled his plan.
There is in the preceding books plenty of advice concerning these very problems which may enable one to see what should be avoided because it is dishonorable, and what need not be avoided because it is not at all dishonorable.
But now we are placing the capstone, as it were, on work that is unfinished and yet almost complete. Therefore, just as geometers do not usually teach everything but demand that certain things are granted them so that they may more easily explain what they want in the same way, I demand that you, my dear Cicero, grant me, if you are able, that nothing except the honorable ought to be sought on its own account.
If, because of Kratopus, you may not do that, you will at least concede that the honorable is the thing that is most greatly to be sought on its own account. Either of these is enough for me. Sometimes the one and sometimes the other seems more persuasive, and no other possibility seems persuasive.
[00:09:51] Chris Anadale: I'm really struck here by the metaphor. Again, back to the metaphor of the body. Well, what do we do to tyrants? Well, we kill tyrants the same way we amputate gangrenous limbs.
And we might say, well, how do I know whether so and so is a tyrant? And we haven't had a lot of guidance on that just yet. I think we might say that's the most important of all prudential judgments, though Cicero has no doubt whatsoever that Caesar was a tyrant, and that he and probably some other people besides him were justly, should have been justly killed in preservation of the common good of the society.
But the answer then to the case of Phalaris is, well, if you can kill him, it is not contrary to nature then to rob him as well, which, I'll be honest, it's kind of the opposite of what I was expecting. I thought he might have said, well, if it's necessary to kill him, that serves the common good by depriving him of the opportunity to harm the state. But how does taking his cloak save the Republic? It seems like it wouldn't. But he's taken this different view. I'll leave it to you two to comment on his. His observation about his regula, his rule about the honorable and the dishonorable, and his exhortations again to young Marcus, believe me. Or if your teacher won't allow you, well, believe something similar. Ethan,
[00:11:21] Ethan Alexander-Davey: I have to admit I'm a little bit puzzled about the rule that's being proposed here, so I'm not sure I can quite sort it out. But I also am struck by the Again, to me in this moment, Cicero sounds like Thomas Jefferson. Right. 6th Semper Tyrannus.
We kill tyrants. We rid the world of this monster in human form, and that is what justice demands.
I'll let Catherine take a stab at the, at what the rule is here.
[00:12:01] Katherine Bradshaw: All right, there is.
So just before, before I jump to that real quick. This tyrant killing is, is very much at the heart of Roman identity at this time, because even going back to their founding of the Republic in the 500s B.C.
it's over A.
An expulsion of a tyrant.
And so the Romans think of themselves as tyrant slayers or tyrant expellers, which is one of the reasons why Caesar being called dictator for life, he's not called king, even though he has basically king powers. Because the Romans don't think that. They just won't submit to the title of king. And that's one of the reasons Augustus always said, no, no, no, I'm just the first among equals. It's fine, I'm not emperor, even though he was.
But to the rule, it seems that this is just something that's very common in kind of the virtue ethics tradition. I think it's interesting that Kratopus might not allow Marcus to say he agrees that the honorable is the only thing to be sought, because it's very similar to some things that Aristotle has said. And Aristotle is, is the founder of the peripatetic school, because Aristotle says that virtues must be sought for their own sakes. Now, he doesn't single out honorableness, but honestas, which is the word behind honorableness in the Latin.
It's. It's this very flexible word that can mean honor, it can mean honorableness, but often it gets translated as moral virtue because it's just so expansive.
And so it seems to me that the biggest issue for Cicero and Marcus is the exclusivity of it.
And so I think it's less that there's a problem of this must be sought for its own sake. Is this the only thing that must be sought for its own sake? Or are there other things that can be allowed to be sought for their own sake? And Aristotle says that you can seek external goods because they contribute to your happiness. You don't seek them for your own sake. But I think for the peripatetics, get a little antsy when you say, oh, virtue is the only thing that should be sought. The Stoics are perfectly comfortable with that though,
[00:14:22] Ethan Alexander-Davey: right?
[00:14:23] Chris Anadale: I took the rule in short form to be that basically you should adhere to honorableness at all times, because whatever is honorable is going to be beneficial, whatever is dishonorable is is going to be not beneficial, right? We see that also in the interpretation of the assassination of Caesar. Therefore, if you just follow honor, you will get the benefit. All that will be added unto you, so to speak. So you don't need to worry about trying to find your way around to get to the beneficial. If it conflicts with honor, it's going to be in that way, not necessarily the opposite way. But going forward, if you follow the honorable dishonorable split, you will always choose correctly and you will always avoid the things that must be avoided.
If I'm reading that correctly, I think it's my turn to read. Next, I will read chapters 34 and 35 for Ethan to comment on.
In the first place, Panaetius must be defended on this count.
It was not things actually beneficial that he said could sometimes conflict with honorable ones, for that was impious for him, but rather things that seemed beneficial. For he often witnesses that nothing is beneficial that is not also honorable, and nothing honorable that is not also beneficial. Indeed, he claims that no greater plague has assailed human life than the fancy of those who have separated the two.
Therefore he introduced the conflict that appears to, but does not in fact exist, not in order that we should sometimes prefer beneficial things to honorable, but rather so that we may adjudicate these things without error if the circumstances should arise.
The part that he left, therefore I shall complete without any auxiliaries, but, as the saying goes, fighting my own battle.
For there is no treatment of this question since Panaeus, at any rate such that meets with my approval in the writings that have come into my hands.
When one encounters something that has the appearance of being beneficial, one is necessarily affected. But it may be that when you apply your mind to it, you see something dishonourable attached to the thing that has presented the appearance of benefit. If so, it is not so much that benefit should be abandoned, but rather that you must realize where dishonorableness exists, there can be nothing beneficial.
For if nothing is so contrary to nature as dishonourableness, nature desires what is right and appropriate and constant, and rejects their opposites.
And if nothing is so much according to nature as the beneficial, then certainly benefit and dishonourableness cannot coexist in the same thing.
Similarly, if we are born for honorableness, and that should be sought alone, as Zeno held, or at least should be thought entirely to outweigh everything else, as was Aristotle's view, it is necessary that what is honorable is either the only good or or the highest. And what is good is Certainly beneficial. And so whatever is honorable is beneficial.
[00:17:34] Ethan Alexander-Davey: All right, so he's introduced again, this is the same argument that he's trying to drive home, that what is honorable and what is beneficial are one. There cannot be a something, cannot be both. What is honorable has to always be beneficial as well. And so the trick here is to recognize that some things seem to be beneficial but are not actually beneficial. And so it's again, a question of judgment. And I think there's also at least the suggestion here that some things seem to be honorable but are not actually honorable. So we have to decide in each case whether the, the thing in question is actually beneficial or only seems to be that way. And if we judge correctly, then we will see that the two things are always compatible.
[00:18:31] Katherine Bradshaw: Yes, now we get to what I would call Cicero's main argument in the entire book is this, as you put so succinctly, Ethan, what is, what is honorable is always the beneficial thing, if you look at it in the right way. And in the long run.
It is funny to me how he says there's no treatment of this question since Benitius, at any rate, that meets with my approval in the writings that have come into my hands. So there's all these qualifiers of, yeah, maybe somebody wrote about it, but I either didn't think it was worthy of being left alone, or at least it didn't come into my hands. I haven't read it, maybe it exists, but I haven't read it. And then he walks us through this basically extended syllogism of, you know, if the honorable is according to nature. And since nature seeks the honorable and seeks what is right, and that is what is according to nature, since those things are true, and since the beneficial will also be what is according to nature, if you look at it in the right way, therefore what is honorable will always be beneficial.
So I think modern tendencies tend to. To go about some of those prep problem, those premises, but the conclusion does follow from the premises and, and the rest of the book is going to be him basically proving and giving examples of this is the case.
And again, he's aligning with the Stoics here because Zeno, the one that he's referring to, is a Stoic philosopher, or at least he's saying, well, we're kind of close to the Peripatetics because he refers to Aristotle. Also,
[00:20:22] Chris Anadale: I take part of his point here, instructing Marcus and also the rest of us, his readers, that we may easily be deceived about the beneficial.
But if we examine any seemingly beneficial thing, and we find even the smallest speck of dishonorableness in it. Well, we know then that it cannot be truly beneficial because the beneficial always is honorable. The suggestion seems to be here that if you have studied virtue, you've studied philosophy, you've been formed properly, you have a rightly attuned sense of honor. Discovering honorableness and dishonorableness will be easier for you than. Than this deceptive play of the world, which may make you misjudge where the truly beneficial things are. So you're using your more accurate sense of honor and dishonor to correct your sometimes flawed judgment of what is beneficial. That's sort of the way that I took that to be.
And my second point, I have, I think, forgotten.
So one is necessarily the syllogism. Oh, I'm sorry. I know what I was going to say.
Cicero's writing in the death of the Republic, maybe beginnings of the imperial period.
I'm thinking of a very different social, political context of. I'm sorry to bring him up again. Machiavelli in Renaissance Italy, where one might say, okay, the trouble here is that if I misjudge the beneficial, I don't merely get put to death by Marc Antony. My entire city is conquered by the French and the ruling class. Class is wiped out. The whole city is undone. And I don't have the privilege of being a sort of member of a class of honorable gentlemen statesmen that survives me and sort of sings my praises and my glorious martyrdom. My city's just wiped out and annexed to a neighboring empire. Where on earth is the benefit in being honorable and going down that way? So the kind of existential panic that goes along with the threat of extermination and domination by foreign powers doesn't seem to be present as part of Cicero's reasoning here. I don't want to say that invalidates it, but it seems to me to place him again in sort of a sharp contrast with a lot of the early modern and late Renaissance thinking that gives rise to our modern patterns of thought about politics and honor and benefit.
I think we have come now to where the. Ethan, I think you're next to read chapters 36 and 37.
[00:23:04] Ethan Alexander-Davey: This, then, is the error made by men who are not upright. As soon as they seize upon something that seems beneficial, immediately they separate it from the honorable. This is the origin of daggers, poisons, and forged wills, of thefts and embezzlements, of public funds and the pillaging and plundering of allies and of citizens. From this arises greed for excessive wealth, for unacceptable power. And finally, even in free cities, for monarchy. One cannot conceive of anything more foul and disgusting than such greed.
In their mistaken judgments they see the profits in things, but they do not see the penalty. I do not mean the penalty of the laws, for they often ride roughshod over that, but that of dishonorableness itself, which is bitter indeed. Therefore, let us drive from our midst. For they are all wicked and irreverent questioners of this sort. Who deliberate over whether to pursue that which they see to be honorable. Or whether knowingly to contaminate themselves with wickedness.
Where there is wickedness in the hesitation itself. Even if they do not go so far as the deed, One should not begin to deliberate questions if the very deliberation of them is dishonorable.
Moreover, whenever we deliberate, we must banish any hope or idea of hiding or concealing our actions. For if we have progressed but a little in philosophy, we ought to be sufficiently persuaded that nothing should be done greedily, unjustly, licentiously or without restraint, Even if we could conceal it from all gods and men.
[00:24:51] Katherine Bradshaw: Here we have the.
It is not even permissible to deliberate on dishonorable things.
So it. I think this is an area where the ancients don't get as much credit philosophically as they should.
That there seems to be to be a notion that the ancients may have been care. They may care, the Romans may care more about externals than internals.
But Cicero says, no, no, no. You can't even internally deliberate on, oh, should I do this honorable thing or should I do this dishonorable thing? That might give me an advantage just to ask that question.
Means that one is not virtuous. Means that one is not honorable. Means that one is actually breaking that fellowship of the human race already.
And so the discussion of virtues, which can seem so external. Particularly when we were talking in book one about virtues like seemliness and decorum.
Is actually just as internal as one would hope.
It's just expressed differently than we might expect.
[00:26:11] Chris Anadale: And also he says here, of course, that I'm speaking not of the penalty of the laws.
Because men like that just run rough out of thinking again. Caesar, Caesar, Caesar. Definitely front in everybody's mind the event of that year.
But rather the penalty of dishonorableness itself. And he's sounding very much like a philosopher now.
Even to do the dishonorable thing. Or as you say, even to contemplate doing, even to deliberate over it. I think perhaps in the American experience, the American political experience, the Closest we might come to the feel of this is to say if a certain policy or action is unconstitutional, without question, we don't even talk about that and debate that out of our respect for the civic order, for the constitutional order. We might say a good politician wouldn't go on about how he's going to sort of sneak this unconstitutional policy by the courts or implement it before he gets caught and stopped by some other powers. That this kind of respect that this commands means that we rule that out of court immediately. And he goes so far then to say, as even these questioners are wicked and irreverent, let us drive them from our midst. He sounds again, very moralistic, very active.
Drive them out of your mind.
Don't listen to these kind of counselors and don't even sort of permit these people to take part in the civic discourse of gentlemen statesmen, of people who really do respect the proper order of things. These people are out of sync with reality and can't be tolerated.
[00:27:51] Ethan Alexander-Davey: Right. And so Plato famously advocated driving the poets from the city. And Cicero would drive the Machiavellians from the city. Right. We've mentioned Machiavelli a few times already.
So even to contemplate the dishonorable as being beneficial, which is most of Machiavelli, most of that approach to politics is. Well, there are all of these circumstances in which you should consider the dishonorable and see the advantages of the dishonorable and weigh the pros and cons of it. But even contemplating the dishonorable is to be avoided. And so this would cut out so much of the modern way of thinking about politics.
Very good.
[00:28:44] Chris Anadale: We're at our final chapters now. Catherine, I'd like to ask you to read chapters 38 and 39 and I'll lead comment and then we'll wrap up.
[00:28:56] Katherine Bradshaw: For this reason, the well known story of Gyges was introduced by Plato.
One day, as a result of heavy rains, the earth gaped open and Gyges went down into the chasm. There he noticed, so the story goes, a bronze horse with a door in its flank. He opened it and inside he saw the body of a dead man of unusual size, with a golden ring on his finger. Gyges stole this and put it on himself. And then he was one of the king's shepherds. He returned to the company of the shepherds.
There he discovered that when he turned the stone in the ring towards his palm, no one could see him, while he himself could see everything. When he turned the ring back to its normal position, he became visible again. And so, using the opportunity given by the ring, he committed adultery with the queen, and with her complicity, he murdered his king and master and removed those whom he thought stood in his way. Nor could anyone see him at his crimes in this way, by courtesy of the ring, he rose swiftly to be king of Lydia. If a wise man then were to have the same ring, he would think himself no more free to do wrong than if he had. If he did not have it, he, for a good man, pursues aims that are not secret but honorable. On this topic, some philosophers, who are not at all bad men, but not clear thinking enough, say that Plato has produced a fictional and fabricated tale, as if indeed he were justifying it either as actually having having happened, or even as possible.
But the force of the ring, end of the example, is as if no one were going to know, if no one were going even to suspect. When you did something for the sake of riches, power, despotism, or lust, if it would always be unknown, by gods and by men alike, then would you do it? They deny that that could have been possible, although it could indeed happen.
But I am in fact asking what they would do if. If the thing that they deny is possible were possible.
They persevere in a boorish manner. They deny that it is possible and insist upon that, failing to see the force of this word, viz. If.
For when we ask what they would do if they could conceal it, we are not asking whether they could in fact conceal it. Rather, we are turning the screws, so to speak, so that if they reply that, given the proposed impunity, they would do the expedient thing, they admit that they are iniquitous. If they deny it, they concede that everything dishonorable should on its own account be avoided. But let me now return to my subject
[00:31:32] Chris Anadale: the great diversion here into Plato. And it does occur to me to wonder if there was ever a time in which this was the main surviving text of this part of Plato. I don't know if Republic was available to the European scholars at all points of.
Of history, if it was only rediscovered at some point later on. But it's a great retelling, includes the details, of course, of the Horse and the Ring and kind of a jousting here with some philosophers who.
I sort of have the philosophy teacher's sympathy with, Cicero, at this point, where he's saying, you've missed the significance of the word if. I'm not asking if it's possible, I'm saying if it were possible, would you do it. And it really comes down to, for Cicero, as for Plato, what is your attitude towards the dissolve Dishonorable? Is the dishonorable revolting and to be avoided in itself for what it does to you? Or is it only to be avoided because it brings with it various social disadvantages? Right. And sort of the ring. A thought experiment that I teach frequently in my classes is meant to bring home to us the question of whether our reasons for avoiding injustice or dishonorable behavior are practical, utilitarian and social, keyed to reputation, or whether they have some psychological or moral factor, if they are interior, if there's some interior kind of justice which is damaged by this type of behavior.
So Cicero, retelling this story, ends it by saying, well, let me get back to my main point. But his point here being that this is the sort of mythological test case.
If you could act with impunity if what happens in Vegas stays in Vegas, would you do it? If so you're telling us that you are an iniquitous person.
That's a confession, as it were, that you have fallen very far from the path of virtue.
[00:33:30] Ethan Alexander-Davey: Yes. And one thing that I noted in here, the possibility that one could do something like this even without the gods knowing, and that's in the modern or Christian perspective, there's nothing we can do without God knowing. There's nothing we could do totally, truly in secret.
But yeah, ultimately the point is that this thought experiment reveals more about the person in question than about. The thought experiment has only that as its purpose, to reveal what kind of person you are. So what would you do in this situation, assuming this is actually possible, how would you evaluate your choices? And if you would do all of these things because there was no negative consequence for you, then that shows that you are a bad person. And then there's nothing more than one can conclude from that.
[00:34:29] Katherine Bradshaw: And that's the power of the example, as you both have said.
And this is how it's used by Plato.
And this is how we get to finally the oh well, if nobody knew, the just man would still act in the same way as he does without the ring.
It's, it's such a, a foreign thing for him to be wicked that he just acts the same whether anyone's watching or not. I do appreciate that he, that Cicero says some philosophers who are not bad men, but who do not think clearly enough.
And our, our footnote points to the, the Epicureans on this because the, the Epicurus was actually a pretty decent man and, and very interested in friendship. It's just that it's not that these people are actually wicked. It's just that they don't think clearly about things. And this is one of the few times that Cicero is being giving, you know, is so merciful with his opponents.
Most of the time they get blasted.
But it is, it is true that sometimes the way of thinking about morality is, is less a matter of wickedness. Particularly I think now, when, when we're just not taught these things as part of the cultural milieu, that there's just a lot of, well, he's never thought of that before. She's never thought of that before. She's never been taught to think about this before.
So of course he's going to persist in saying, but it never can happen because he's not used to experiments like this. So here Cicero is really putting forward. It's just that they don't, it's, they don't think clearly enough about it. And here's how I'm why I'm writing this for you so that you can think clearly about this.
[00:36:31] Chris Anadale: Very good. Thank you, Catherine.
You have been listening to the Cicero on Duties podcast, a production of the Ciceronian Society. Thank you to my co hosts today, Catherine Bradshaw and Ethan Alexander Davy. If you liked this episode, please subscribe to this podcast and share it with a friend. To learn about more about all of our programming, please visit ciceroniansociety.org thank you for listening. Sam.
