Cicero On Duties, Episode 46 - Malicious Fraud

Episode 46 • November 18, 2026 • 00:34:54
Cicero On Duties, Episode 46 - Malicious Fraud
Cicero On Duties
Cicero On Duties, Episode 46 - Malicious Fraud

Nov 18 2026 | 00:34:54

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Show Notes

The civil law should contain all that is in the natural law. With hosts Josh Bowman, Chris Anadale, Katherine Bradshaw, and Coyle Neal.
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IN THIS EPISODE
Book 3, Chapters 61-69
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INDEX
0:00 Introduction to Episode 46
1:25 Book 3 Ch 61-62, Malicious Fraud
12:02 Book 3 Ch 63-64, Self-Enrichment
18:41 Book 3 Ch 65-67, Civil Law & Property
27:38 Book 3 Ch 68-69, Law & Reason vs Craftiness
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MENTIONED IN THIS EPISODE
2027 Colloquium on Uncivil Discourse, January 23-24 in Scottsdale, AZ: https://ciceroniansociety.org/conferences/colloquium2027/

2027 Spring Conference in Virginia Beach, VA, March 11-13, Registration is now open: https://ciceroniansociety.org/conference-spring/2027-conference-registration/

Apply to enroll in Logres Institute courses: https://www.logresinstitute.org/enroll-populi

CS Lewis Book. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/English_Literature_in_the_Sixteenth_Century_(Excluding_Drama)
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HOSTS
Joshua Bowman is Executive Director of the Ciceronian Society, and earned a PhD in politics from the Catholic University of America.

Christopher Anadale is podcast editor for the Ciceronian Society, and Associate Professor of Philosophy at Mount St. Mary's University in Emmitsburg, Maryland.

Katherine L. Bradshaw is a Latin and Greek Fellow with the Ancient Language Institute and a Ph.D. student in Humanities through Faulkner University. She has an M.A. in Classics from the University of Maryland and an M.A. in English from the George Washington University.

Coyle Neal is Associate Professor of Public Service at College of the Ozarks. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Theory from The Catholic University of America and is the author of Echoes of Antiquity. He is also City Tax Collector of Bolivar, Missouri.
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TEXTS
Translation we read from: https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/politics-international-relations/texts-political-thought/cicero-duties?format=PB&isbn=9780521348355

Another (free) translation: https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/cicero-on-moral-duties-de-officiis
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The Ciceronian Society encourages and equips Christian Scholars as they serve the church. To learn more, visit https://ciceroniansociety.org/

Check out our other Podcast, THE SOWER: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL1B7f66VCvfZnkwh_UjXjhXEg5P8dUq0q

Music: No. 4 Piano Journey, by Esther Abrami

#cicero #philosophy #ethics

Chapters

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Episode Transcript

[00:00:00] Josh Bowman: Hello everyone. Welcome to a new episode of Cicero. On Duties, we are reading through Cicero's magnum opus De Officiis, together with the members of the Ciceronian Society linked to the particular translation we're using. The Cambridge text in the History of Political Thought is available there in the show Notes. We're getting real close to the end here, aren't we? If you've been following along, thanks for sticking with us. This has been a lot of fun. We do plan to keep doing this with other writings of Cicero. Which writing? We have not yet decided that. We're pretty close, so stay tuned and we hope you will continue to do this. And please share this podcast with others. This is meant to live online for many generations. To enlighten everyone on this book that they should be reading along with us, I am joined today. By the way, I am Josh Bowman, Executive Director of the Ciceronian Society. I'm joined by Chris Anadale of Mount St. Mary's University, Catherine Bradshaw of the Ancient Language Institute, and Coyle Neal of College of the Ozarks. We are so happy you're here. We are in book three of Ciceros de Officis. We're going to start book three, chapter 61. I'm going to start with the sentence before that. I will read and then Quail will comment and we'll go as we usually do. No action of that sort can be beneficial, imbued as it is with so many vices. If the definition of Aquillius is true, then both pretense and dissembling must be removed from our whole lives. The good man, then, will neither pretend nor dissemble, whether in order to sell or to buy at a better price. Moreover, such malicious fraud had already been liable to punishment by the laws, for example, in the matter of guardianships in the 12 tables, or that of defrauding minors. Under the Platorian law and without a specific law in the law courts, whenever the stipulation in good faith is added from other court cases. Moreover, the following phrases particularly stand out in a judgment over a wife's property Better, if fairer in the restoration of a trust to act well as among good men, well then can the phrase better if fairer, countenance any share in deceit? And if one says to act well as among good men, can anything be done deceitfully or with ill intention? Malicious fraud consists in pretense, as Aquilius said, therefore all untruthfulness must be removed from our dealings. The seller will not employ an artificial bidder, nor the buyer someone to bid low against him. If one of the two has come to declare a price, he should not do so more than once. Indeed, Quintus Scaevola, the son of Publius, once asked the man from whom he was buying a farm to name a definite price. And when he did so, Scaevola said, he. He thought it worth more than that, and he added 100,000 sesterces to the price. No one denies that a good man would do that, but they do deny that a wise man would, just as if someone had sold it at a lower price than he might have. Such things are ruinous. For their view is that the good man and the wise are different. Ennius said, as a result, the wise man should be wise in vain if he could not profit himself. Well, that would indeed be true if Ennius and I were in agreement as to what it might be to profit. [00:03:41] Coyle Neal: Yeah, that line at the end of 61. Therefore, all untruthfulness must be removed from our dealings. Should be everyone's social media profile. Right? I mean, that should really define what we do in public, but especially in fake public on the Internet. This whole section, and I'm sure this will come up time and time again, We. We live in an era of untruth where. Where maybe we might switch out profit and put in its place winning, where you. You say what you can to win, and who cares if it's true or not? You. You do damage control after you've won. I don't know that I have much more to add other than just to keep saying that over and over and over. Cicero's. Cicero's time is much like our own, and I'm often very uncomfortable with. With how much like. [00:04:31] Katherine Bradshaw: Yes, the parallels are a little unnerving sometimes. So Cicero, of course, is referring, as our listeners will remember, to Aquilius's definition of fraud, which is to say one thing and mean another, or to act one way and pretend to act another way. And so this is a legal definition, but Cicero saying, well, that's. That's a good definition for legal and others. And it's interesting to me how he will. He pulls from legal language so much in this that it's not just that this is a good thing in interpersonal relations. But he's saying, but look what we do in our contract laws and our inheritance laws and things, we have these bits of language which I think by the time of Cicero were sort of pro forma. You know, we. We just stick in good faith or the better is the fairer or the fairer is better on the documents. Do we really think about what it means? Maybe not. But Cicero is saying, well, they're there. Maybe we should take them seriously. And so Cicero is bringing out the. The reality behind what have now become pro forma ceremonies in order to kind of reinvigorate them in a virtuous manner. [00:06:01] Christopher Anadale: It's interesting in a way, to think about a man in the first century B.C. writing about, well, you know, we live in the remnants of a once honorable society. People used to take these sorts of things seriously in economics and in trade, but no longer. So I'm impressed with this tale of Quintius Scaevola, who does what a good man would do, that is, he boosts the price to match the value of the property, rather than take advantage of the acceptance of a low bid offer. But it then brings this reflection, very timely for us as well, about whether one really is obligated or should be a good man in trade. If somebody voluntarily agrees to accept less for his property, why shouldn't that be what I give him? And so we're facing again, specifically in the matter of commerce, the question of what is a fair price? What is a good price? How much of your interest should I value in weight against my interest, which is in getting more of your money? And Cicero seems to think there really is a legitimate right answer to this. You should be a good man. You should deal with people honestly without deception, et cetera. The fact that we are so far from that seems to place us in a position equal or inferior to many of the people he's writing to in his own time. [00:07:21] Josh Bowman: So I'll just conclude the reflections on this passage with. I'm not sure I follow Cicero's reasoning here with Scaevola. So the idea is that Scaevola is paying more than what someone asked for for this property. I don't know where the dishonesty is here. Right. So in a sense that he's. In the sense that unless I'm missing something, that whatever he was buying from someone, he said, this is worth more than what I paid for, than what I paid for. So I'm going to give you what it's worth to me. [00:07:57] Coyle Neal: Yeah. [00:07:58] Josh Bowman: Instead of. Instead of what you're asking for, there doesn't seem to be any deception here. And just to make this deeply personal, I suppose I was at a library in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, years ago, and I found the C.S. lewis's study of 16th century literature for 25 cents. I would have paid $50 for this, at least. Probably more Right. And I remember getting really excited. No one deceived me on what this book was, what its value was, but it was 25 cents. It was a used book sale. I bought it for a quarter. And it was, you know, in Cicero's mind, if it was that valuable to me, was I wrong? So let me just put that question quickly to you guys, and then we can move on to the next passage. [00:08:45] Coyle Neal: Yeah. If I'm reading this right, the point is that you were not wrong, Josh. You were stupid. [00:08:52] Josh Bowman: Oh, okay. [00:08:52] Coyle Neal: Yeah. No, Scaevola. If I'm reading this the right way, he is being a good man when he is paying fair market value for this thing he's buying. But he's not being a wise man. So a wise man would not have paid $50 for the book. Wise man would have paid the 25 cents. But a good would have. Would have said, hey, you know, this is actually worth much more. Much more. As if librarians somehow didn't know the value of the books they put on cinema. It's worth remembering they know what they're worth. [00:09:23] Josh Bowman: Yeah, yeah, [00:09:25] Katherine Bradshaw: yeah. I think. I think that there is no dishonesty. This is meant to be a good example from Cicero. So Cicero is saying that other people would say that Scaevola is not wise. He's actually saying that Scaevola is both good and wise for paying more than the market value, market value more than what the seller is asking for. But. But Skyvola is adding to the price and saying, no, I'll pay more. And so he is actually being held up as the good example and say. And Cicero's about. He's preparing the rest of his argument here. He's saying, like other people will say, that he's not wise. I'm about to prove to you why he is wise. So. But again, as Coyle pointed out, Josh, I think, again, your librarian will know that it's just that he or she wants the space more than he or she wants the book. And so it's worth it to them to lose a lot of money on the book in order to get the space. [00:10:32] Christopher Anadale: Yeah. I think the economic philosophical issue here in the background is whether economic value is purely subjective or is partly your wholly objective. Is the value of the farm a property of the farm itself, or is it simply a matter of how badly you want it versus how badly I want it, Given each of our circumstances, like you say, Catherine the librarian may need the space very, very badly, which drives down the value of possessing the book in their mind. And I think we moderns tend to think of the price is the market price, which is what people agree, what two people agree, or what the sort of market all participants overall agree, that is the correct price for it, sort of the just and the right price. And I think Cicero is working with something more that I've also seen in Aquinas, that the value of a book he uses this example is a property of the book, in a sense. And if you pay me the amount of money that the book is worth, then you and I have made an even trade. But if you pay me less, then you've partly bought the book and you've partly received it as a gift from me. The value that you haven't paid for has been transferred to you without compensation to me. And I think something like that might be informing this here. So the transition to a modern market economy, where we think of value as being entirely subjective, each person assigns it according to their own circumstances, and we just meet in the middle at a market price that I don't think is operative for Cicero here. I'm sorry to have said so much. [00:11:55] Josh Bowman: Right, go ahead, Coyle, read the starting in chapter 63. Right. Yeah. [00:12:04] Coyle Neal: I see that Hecaton of Rhodes, Panaetius, pupil, said in the books about duty that he wrote for Quintus Tubero that a wise, wise man would, without acting contrary to customs, laws and established practices, take account of his personal wealth. We do not wish to be rich for our own sake alone, but for our children, our friends, most of all for the political community. The capacities and resources of individuals are the riches of the city. He would not be at all able to agree with Scaevola's action, as I related it just now. For Hecaton declares that he would refrain from doing for the sake of his own gain only what is not permitted. He should be accorded no great praise or gratitude. Anyway, if malicious fraud covers both pretending and dissembling, there are very few matters to which such malicious fraud is not relevant. Alternatively, if the good man is the one who assists whoever he can and harms no one, it is certain that such a good man is not easy to find. To sum up, it is never beneficial to be wrong, because it is always dishonorable. Moreover, because it is always honorable to be a good man, it has always beneficial. [00:13:07] Katherine Bradshaw: And here we go into the rest of the argument. It is. It is interesting how much Cicero, even though he has used a lot of legal discourse, doesn't stay there, because Hecaton is basically saying, well, I. I keep the law I don't do anything that's illegal, but I also don't go out of my way to go beyond what is required of me. And it is interesting how quick how, how, how close Cicero gets up to that line of, you know, what we would consider Christian virtue and just, you know, as far as we can get with natural revelation. Because this is going. This is very similar in. To, well, if you do good to those who do good to you, what. What credit do you have? You don't get a lot of praise from the Sermon on the Mount, but for Cicero, it's, well, you don't do any harm to anybody. That's kind of the minimum. In order to be a truly virtuous person, you should do positive good to others, not just. Not do harm to others. [00:14:20] Christopher Anadale: Of course, this last chapter here ends with one of Cicero's summaries. It is never beneficial to do wrong. If you think you can benefit by doing wrong, that the right and the beneficial are opposed to each other, you are mistaken, my friend, because to do wrong is dishonorable and therefore contrary to benefit to your true benefit. And by the same token, it's always honorable to be a good man, and for that reason, it's always beneficial to be a good man. So in a sense, benefit and advantage falls out. Just. Just adhere to honor and virtue and justice and forswear wrongdoing and you'll be fine. He's collapsed these two categories together, made the beneficial. Sort of a beneficial is a lesser included category of the honorable and the just. [00:15:05] Josh Bowman: Yeah. And I want to echo what Catherine said about some of these. This kind of proto Christian virtue. I mean, it obviously predates Christianity because God created the world, and so his natural revelation is there, natural law exists. Cicero accepts that, and it's so striking to me how close he gets. I mean, this is why I said months ago about Martin Luther, you know, wishing Cicero was in heaven. Right. In the sense that he just. He wanted to find some way to explain that and other writers would agree. What strikes me as interesting here is what reason can Cicero give for this statement in a kind of eternal, cosmic sense? Because if this life is all there is, which I don't, you know, and we haven't read the books that. Where Cicero talks about an afterlife and what he believes. It's an interesting question. Here is, and I think there is an answer here, by the way, why, in a kind of eternal sense, in a kind of moral, ontological maybe sense, what, what good is it to do all this? Why does, you know, you know, Would. Would Nietzsche read this and be like, what's the point? Right? This isn't this. You know, what good does it do to do all, to act like this? You're just weak, Cicero. Machiavelli, you're just weak, Cicero, you know, the. The wise man, the clever man. You have to do what you got to do. Stop being so moralistic about this. The world is the way it is. Suck it up and realize sometimes you got to play dirty. Now that just so our viewers know, that's not my personal opinion, but there is a sense in which. But the reason it's not my opinion is because as a Christian, I can't see myself moving in that direction in the sense that the reason I think Cicero is right here is because of the eternal consequences and the fact that I will be held accountable by a just God for these things. So, in a sense, where is Cicero? There. And Coyle, you can answer that if anybody else wants to jump in. I just think that's a. It strikes me as a piece that's lacking here. [00:17:23] Coyle Neal: Yeah. For what it's worth my vote, if we're going to keep moving through, Cicero, would be for the Tusculan disputations, which is where he wrestles with all of that [00:17:31] Josh Bowman: interesting [00:17:32] Coyle Neal: and hands down, best Cicero. I mean, that's where you find his stuff on friendship and old age and all of that. And it's fantastic. I would actually kind of echo Josh's question, at least a version of it. And I think one of the difficulties with reading it the way we're reading it here, where we have different hosts, aside from Chris in bits and pieces over. Over the weeks, is we get to that line at the end of 64, to sum up. And I don't know that he has. I'm not entirely sure that that is a summary. It is. It is never beneficial to do wrong because it is always dishonorable. Sure. But I don't know that that necessarily follows from paying a fair market price for someone's field or for whatever it is that we have just immediately read. Now, I know having. Having read the whole thing, I know that there is a flow of the argument, and those are just pieces of the overall argument. I get that. But reading two paragraphs a week, that. That I think kind of gets lost. So that's. That's my comment. [00:18:33] Christopher Anadale: Catherine, would you like to do the next reading and take us through chapter 65 through 67? [00:18:39] Katherine Bradshaw: Certainly, if it is indeed laid down in the part of our civil law concerning properties that when they are sold Whatever faults are known to the seller should be stated in the 12 tables. It was enough that one should accept responsibility for those faults that were verbally specified. If the seller had denied these, he should face the double penalty. The jurisconsults, however, have been established a penalty for keeping quiet, for they decided that if the seller knew about any fault in a property, unless he had expressly declared it, he ought to be responsible for it. In one case of this type of the augurs were going to take an augury on the citadel, and they ordered Tiberius Claudius Centumalus, who had a house on the Chalian hill, to demolish that part of it that was high enough to obstruct the auspices. Claudius advertised the block for sale, and Publius Calpurnius Lenarius bought it. The augurs made the same demand of him, and Calpurnius pulled down the required bit. When he discovered that Claudius had advertised the house as after he had been ordered by the augurs to demolish some of it, he compelled him to go before the arbitrator as to what compensation he ought to have made in accordance with the demands of good faith. The verdict was given by Marcus Cato, the father of our Cato for as other men take their name from their fathers, this man who fathered so bright a star takes his from the sun. He then, as judge pronounced that since the seller had known the facts with when he sold and had not reported them, he ought to be responsible for the loss incurred by the buyer. Thus he established that it was a part of good faith that the buyer should learn of any fault that the seller knew. If his judgment was correct, then neither the corn dealer nor the seller of the unsanitary house was right to keep quiet. The civil law cannot completely embrace reticences of this kind. Insofar as it can, however, it carefully contains them. Marcus Marius Gratidianus, a relation of mine, sold to Gaius Sergius Orata a house that he had bought from the same man only a few years before. It was under a liability, but Marius did not state that in the contract of sale. The matter was brought to court. Orata was defended by Crassus and Gratidianus by Antonius. Crassus insisted on the law. The seller did not state the faults that he knew, therefore he ought to take responsibility. Antonius urged fairness, since the fault was not known to Sergius, for he had sold the house in the first place, there was no need to state it. He was not deceived, since he knew the legal position of the property that he had bought. What is my point then? That you should realize that crafty men did not please our ancestors. [00:21:27] Christopher Anadale: More real estate intrigue from Cicero, as we saw in the previous episodes. It just impresses me here that the need for things like title insurance and all the things that we've dealt with with when we've had to buy a home or get an inspection and searching for vermin in the basement, et cetera, goes all the way back more than 2,000 years to Rome. But here's an interesting sort of test case, right? Cicero's conclusion feels a little bit weak here. Just that dishonest men did not please our ancestors. If we wish to honor our ancestors, we should adopt the same severe attitude of the elder Cato. But that, well, look, the fault was not unknown to Sergius. Sergius had means of finding it out for himself. The fact that I didn't tell him doesn't mean that I failed somehow in my duty to him. But again, the idea here seems to be that there's a certain expectation that you owe a duty of honesty and equality of information between the buyer and the seller, that if you violate that, you violated some important duty, that officium that you owe to him. [00:22:38] Josh Bowman: Yeah, I won't say much here. I'd rather just kind of put a question out there for both our listeners, viewers and anyone else. It's striking. These last several episodes, we've focused a lot on property. In particular this notion of honorableness, wisdom, beneficence, all these things, they don't just relate to economic transactions. Right. And yet Cicero has spent a lot of time there. What is going on in the late republic that is that a reflection of a breakdown in the rule of law when it comes to the economy? Is it a breakdown in just society in a sense that no one trusts anyone anymore to honestly distribute property in a free exchange? Is his focus here emblematic of deeper issues? Emblematic. But is it pointing to deeper issues in the society that is, that is collapsing around him? Or is this just reflective of Cicero, the lawyer? This is just what he dealt with all the time. Right. These are the kind of disputes that came to him on a regular basis as a, as a lawyer. And this is just, it was just on his mind at the time. And so, and also, I mean, he also had been deprived of much of his property by this point as well. So I, I, those are just some thoughts that come to mind. I don't offer answers, but I think that's an interesting context. And I wonder why he's choosing These particular examples for something like this. [00:24:07] Coyle Neal: Yeah, if it helps. The property is the formal cause, I think is the right philosophical term of the Roman revolution. For 100 years prior to Cicero, at this point, Romans have been fighting over property. Just as the republic has expanded and there's more property available, who owns it becomes kind of the core question. And should it be distributed to the poor? Should the rich people who kind of got there first with the military and claimed it, should they get to claim it? What do we do? So the Gracchi brothers. Yeah, brothers. Are leading reforms over this. Trying to lead reforms over this. Pompey the Great gets involved in this. Sulla gets involved in this. Julius Caesar is primarily concerned with settlement land for his soldiers, or at least that's what he says. Right. That's the initial claim is. Is I just want land for my soldiers. So property is. Is all over the ancient republic, in part because there's so much of it. And traditional Roman law doesn't necessarily govern what you do with property outside of Rome. So then it becomes, well, is the person honest? Are they not honest? Maybe we should extend the law. Well, we did extend the law, but are we really extending. There's. There's a lot going on there, which I actually wanted to talk about just a touch of that. It. It's interesting to see the appeal to the 12 tables and then the disagreements over the right interpretation. Right. This ancient law that is the standard, and everyone knows it's the standard, but we don't agree on what the right way to read it is. Where even attorneys in Cicero's time are arguing over kind of fine points of it that affect the outcome very much like we still do today. [00:25:52] Katherine Bradshaw: Yes. And, Josh, going back to your question, I. I think there's also an element here of the fact that property is illustrative. It's. It's particular because it's tangible, because we can say, okay, this property went from this person to this person. And it's kind of like when you're. It's a language teacher example. When you're teaching. When you're teaching certain grammatical concepts, you make them extremely concrete. So things like you talk about people hitting things or something like that to turn to explain certain grammatical concepts. Because it says physical action, it's like, okay, this affected that. And so similarly with Cicero, if you're talking about honesty and good relations between people, it's very easy to understand, oh, a, cheated B, in this property transaction. Whereas if you say, like, in the abstract, revealing as much information as possible in order that the other person will know what's going on. It's. It's a little bit vague and kind of up in the air somewhere. But if you add money to it and property to it, then it becomes very concrete and graspable. I think this is one of the reasons why, you know, our Lord talks about money a lot, both literally and in parables, because we understand it. We understand those sorts of things. So I think this is also a rhetorical play, as well as it being a cultural thing that is really on his mind because he's living in the late Republic. [00:27:30] Christopher Anadale: Well, I think I'll take the last reading for this episode, chapters 68 and 69, for Josh to comment on. However, the laws and the philosophers remove craftiness in different ways. The laws, so far as they can lay their hands upon it. Philosophers, their reason and intelligence. I'm sorry. The laws lay their hands. Lay their hands upon it. Craftiness, Philosophers, their reason and intelligence. Reason then demands that nothing is done insidiously, deceptively, or with pretense. It is not insidious to set a trap, even if you are not intending to startle the game or to hunt it. For wild beasts often fall into traps, even when no one is chasing them. Is it not the same if you advertise your house, put up a notice just like a trap, sell it because of its faults, and let some foolish person run into it? I see that because custom is so corrupted, such behavior is neither thought dishonorable nor forbidden by statute and civil law. It is, however, forbidden by the law of nature. For there is a fellowship that is extremely widespread, shared by all, with all. Even if this has often been said, it ought to be said still more often. A closer one exists among those of the same nation, and one more intimate still among those of the same city. For this reason, our ancestors wanted the law of nations and the civil law to be different. Everything in the civil law need not be in the law of nations, but everything in the law of nations ought also to be a part of civil law. We, however, do not have the firm and lifelike figure of true law and genuine justice. We make use of shadows and sketches. I wish we would follow even those, for they are drawn from the best examples of nature and truth. [00:29:28] Josh Bowman: This. This is a great passage, and we. This is a little dangerous because we have to finish this episode. We could talk forever about just this. But I love the way he ends it. He says, we, however, do not have the firm and lifelike figure of true law and genuine justice. And Augustine and the Christians are Going to be like, not yet. It's. He's coming, right? You know, we make use of shadows and sketches. He knows there's something missing. Right. I mean, in some ways it's a Platonic type thing, right? In the sense that we know this is just that this world is. Is what it is. It's not the, the form of the good. We're doing the best we can. And I wish we could even follow those. Let's just follow the stinking shadows. We're not even doing that. And I think that's, that's, that's really telling for the particular moment and the distinctions he makes between the law of nature and the civil law. I'll, I'll let someone else comment on that, but I, I think that is incredibly insightful here in the sense that he is. He is pointing toward. I mean, is it too far to say he's pointing toward Christ? I don't know. You know, not intentionally, certainly, but I think it's. Yeah, it's telling. You know, let's at least follow the shadows is a great, A great line. [00:30:46] Coyle Neal: Yeah, I think it's. It's a fascinating passage. Like you said, this passage kind of gets at the core problem of politics and compresses both domestic and foreign politics into. Into one passage. And it's. It's all about the problem of bad actors, right? What, what would we need politics for? Like kind of Federal Federalist Papers echoes. If, if everyone were just a good person, we wouldn't need it, but we're not. So we need some kind of process to deal with people both at home and abroad who are going to be doing bad things. And we, we don't do that very well because we don't really follow it ourselves. But we all know that that's the core problem. [00:31:29] Katherine Bradshaw: And the contrast between the natural law and the civil law, we've touched on, of course, several times before. But this is a particularly strong moment of contrast because when our translation says the law of nations, it doesn't mean our modern idea of a law of all the different. You know, it's not the UN Convention or something like that. It's. It's the law of human nature is the idea. This is the thing that's above any particular country's civil law. This is what we all should be able to appeal to because we all share humanity. We are all gente. We are all in. In a gains. The. The word for nation here is gains. We're all in a nation. A people group is probably an even better way to translate it, because we have this very post Westphalian idea of nation that Cicero doesn't have. And so the, the thing here is, it's interesting that he says not everything in the, in the civil law needs to be in the law of nations. It doesn't. All, not every civil law has to be a natural law, but every natural law should be included in the civil law. That is what it should be based on. That is what it should be depending on and what it should be pointing us to. [00:33:00] Christopher Anadale: Yeah, I take here to be really important, the beginning of the first of these chapters. The law and the philosophers combat craftiness in different ways. The law by force, by putting its hands on things. And we think that's strongest in the civil law, in the place where we have the smallest group, the group that is most closely bound together by social ties and then philosophers by reason and intelligence, by rational persuasion, by exhortations to virtue. And that seems to me to be the place where we have to appeal, where force can't be readily deployed. In the law of nations, for example, that's the place where we have to appeal to people's honor or instruct them to be good. And Coyle, as you pointed out, that's the fundamental problem of politics, in a sense, is how can we join goodness with force? Are we looking to replace one with the other? Can they both attain to the same end? Josh [00:34:00] Josh Bowman: all right, well, I think that concludes this episode. Thank you so much for joining us. If you've made it this far into the series and into this episode alone, you're probably the type of person that would enjoy a Ciceronian Society event. And so please check out our website and see what's coming up next here at this recording. We're getting ready for a colloquium in January in Scottsdale, Arizona, January 23rd on uncivil discourse. Great lineup of speakers. It's a free event, so if you can get to Scottsdale, come join us. We'll also be in Virginia Beach March 11th through the 13th, 2027, for our annual spring conference. It's going to be a huge event, a lot of exciting papers and people will be there and a lot of great conversations to be had. So thank you for joining us. Don't forget about our other podcast, the Sower. Have a great week and we'll see you next Wednesday.

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