Episode Transcript
[00:00:00] Speaker A: Foreign.
[00:00:10] Speaker B: Welcome back to the On Duties Podcast, a production of the Ciceronian Society. To learn more about us and our activities, visit ciceroniansociety.org we are reading through the entirety of Cicero's On Duties with commentary from a rotating cast of scholars associated with this with the Society. We publish a new episode every Wednesday in audio on all platforms and video on our YouTube channel. I'm Chris Anadale, Associate professor of Philosophy at Mount St. Mary's University and proprietor of a small YouTube channel of my own.
Joining us today are series regulars Ethan Alexander Davy, associate professor of political science at Campbell University in North Carolina, and Ben Peterson, assistant professor of political science at Abilene Christian University in Texas.
Our new co host this week is Coyle Neal, who is stepping into a position as associate professor of public service at College of the Ozarks. He holds a PhD in Political Theory from the Catholic University of America and is the author of Echoes of Antiquity, which he calls a not very exciting book on Hellenistic philosophy and politics. He's also city tax collector of Bolivar, Missouri.
Coyle, welcome to the show.
[00:01:26] Speaker A: Thanks for having me.
[00:01:27] Speaker B: Okay, well, this is the first time we've tried four co hosts, and I think we'll do the same format as we typically do. We'll take turns reading and then commenting.
We have gotten up as far as Chapter 93 in On Duties, Book 1, dealing with the honorable. Cicero's finished his treatment of three of the four virtues he's going to discuss. He's talked about wisdom, about justice and its twin, liberality, and then about greatness of spirit connected with ambition and the kind of a loftiness that disdains material things. We're moving next into a long consideration of a cluster of virtues under the heading of seemliness. And we'll be talking about this for the next couple of episodes, I'm sure.
Ethan, would you Please read chapters 93, 94, and 95?
And Coyle, I'll give you first comment on this if you wish.
[00:02:24] Speaker C: All right.
Next we must discuss the one remaining element of honorableness. Under this appear a sense of shame and what one might call the ordered beauty of a life, restraint and modesty, a calming of all the agitations of the spirit, and due measure in all things. Under this heading is included what in Latin may be called decorum, seemliness, the Greek for it is prepon.
The essence of this is that it cannot be separated from what is honorable. For what is seemly is honorable, and what is honorable is seemly. It is easier to grasp than to explain what the difference is between Honorable and seemly. For whatever it may be, what is seemly is manifested then, when the honorable precedes it. For this reason, what is seemly appears not only in the part of the honorable that we must discuss here. But also in the first three parts. It is seemly to use reason and speech sensibly. To do what one does with forethought in everything. To see and to gaze on what is true.
On the other hand, mistakes, errors, lapses, misjudgments. Are as unseemly as delirious and sandy.
Seemly, too, is everything that is just. But what is unjust, being dishonorable is unseemly. There is a similar story to tell about courage. What is done in a great and manly spirit. Seems worthy of a human being. And seemly. As for the opposite being dishonorable, it is unseemly. Therefore, this seemliness of which I speak relates to the whole of honorableness.
And it is related in such a way that. That it is not seen by esoteric reasoning. But springs ready to view. For there is indeed such a thing as the seemly. And one grasps that it is in every virtue. It is, however, more easily separated from virtue in thought than in fact.
Just as bodily loveliness and beauty. Cannot be separated from healthiness. Similarly, the seemliness that we are discussing. Is indeed completely blended with virtue.
But is distinguished by thought and reflection.
[00:04:44] Speaker B: Thank you. Coyle, what are your thoughts?
[00:04:47] Speaker A: Yeah, I'm Team Cicero.
[00:04:50] Speaker C: Right.
[00:04:50] Speaker A: So if we're looking at kind of Cicero's era in history. Your only real options, like the four options. Julius Caesar, Augustus Caesar, Cicero, and maybe Catiline, if you want that side of society. Also, I don't think the other three would understand this section.
You cannot imagine either of the Caesars being concerned with seemliness. Whatever their legitimate concerns with virtue might be.
That would be an element of it that would just be not on their radar. Maybe Augustus in his older years would have been more interested in it. Catalan, of course, is having no interest in this. But the placing of a virtue. Not just being a virtue in and of itself, but also proper.
That's something that takes a special kind of mind to think of. And Cicero does it, I think, very well.
Okay, that's what I've got.
[00:05:48] Speaker B: Okay, thanks, Ben. What do you think?
[00:05:50] Speaker D: Yeah, I think this one is an interesting one of the virtues here. Because, I mean, it maybe isn't one of the ones we think of as the cardinal virtues. Right.
Prudence, temperance. Maybe kind of related to temperance, courage, all these different virtues. And actually, he Kind of has to explain a little bit here. Look, I know this particular virtue of seemliness sort of goes along with all the other ones because, you know, to be just is. Is seemly right to exercise courage when you need it is seemly right and so on and so forth. But it is. I do think it's. It's notable that he wants to spend some time just on this idea of, like you said, this cluster of virtues that goes along with fittingness, seemliness, you know, are things done in the proper way? Right. Decorum. Right. There's a really interesting book that I read for a project I was working on called. I think it's called Civility by Stephen Carter. And I know there's a lot of interest in this topic of civility right now with. You know, there's maybe some reasons for that, some loss of civility and some places, but there's kind of. There's a. There's an interest in this kind of literature on the question of. Are the. Are the rules of propriety and decorum and seemliness? Are these things really moral in character or are these really especially conventional? Right. Are these just. Well, you know, we kind of have to have ways of getting along with each other. And so it's not deeply moral. And it seems like Cicero wants to put this in the category of there's something moral about cultivating this notion of seemliness, of what is expected of you and how you. And not just what you do, but the manner in which you do it. Right. And so I was especially interested that the very first element of this that he mentions is shame. Right. And so he'll later talk about how we're not supposed to care about what others think of us in the sense of that we shouldn't sacrifice the virtue, you know, other virtues in trying to gain fame or glory or something. But we are supposed to care about.
For him, we are supposed to care about kind of how our actions are received.
And we should have a proper sense of shame. What are people going to think about this if they found out right is part of being a just person? So I think it's a really interesting section.
[00:08:06] Speaker B: Yeah. I think I would add my thoughts kind of parallel yours, one might think. Sounds like we're moving kind of in an aesthetic direction here. Wait a minute. One must not only do what is right, but one must do it in a way that is kind of beautiful or pleasing or somehow appropriate in a conventional way. One must be well thought of. We might associate this with a kind of a bourgeois concern for respectability. Which we would think is at the very least, kind of sort of super moral.
[00:08:34] Speaker D: Right.
[00:08:34] Speaker B: Sort of adds on to what's already the sort of the core of what's good. We dislike phoniness and a sort of excessive attention to what is thought of when amur probe, perhaps in the modern sense. But Cicero seems to be. He takes this quite seriously. He's treating it last, but he is treating it very seriously and at great length. Right. One needs to, you know, be mod. Engage in action in a way that is moderate and that shows moderation, that displays it for others, that shows a kind of respect for others that he'll say later on, avoids outraging their feelings.
So an attention to how other people see you seems to be this kind of final element, sort of maybe the outermost shell of a person who performs his duties. Does it correctly, excellently and well. Ethan, back to you.
[00:09:24] Speaker C: Yes, if I could just be a little bit pretentious and point to the original Latin at the beginning of this passage. So there's this. The line in Latin is quasi quidam ornatus vitae. And we can hear in that ornatus ornate, like our word, ornate. So seemliness is, as you suggested, Chris, it's an aesthetic. It has an aesthetic quality to it. And to do things properly, that's another one of those words that has sort of lost its meaning in modern times. But to do things properly is beautiful. To do things properly, as this old 1915 translation I have, it, gives a sort of polish to life. Our translation is it gives an ordered beauty to life, and this is important. So to live morally, to live rightly, to follow justice, is beautiful in a sense, but also to act in a certain way, to act properly, to act correctly, to observe the social graces, is beautiful. And going back to Ben's comment, I think for Cicero, this is definitely a moral category. This is something that is ordained by nature that those who are capable of this should live this way and set an example for others in living properly and making living properly attractive because of its appeal to the aesthetic sense. So that's what I'll add to this passage that three of you have already commented on.
[00:11:12] Speaker B: That's great. Thank you, Coyle, I think I'd like you to read next, if you don't mind. Let's take chapters 96 and 97 together, and then, Ben, you take first comment.
[00:11:22] Speaker C: Sure.
[00:11:25] Speaker A: But furthermore, this has two senses. First, we understand the seemliness of a general kind involved with honorable behavior as a whole. And secondly, something subordinate to this, which relates to an individual element of what is honorable. The former has customarily defined something like what is seemly is that which agrees with the excellence of man, just where his nature differs from that of other creatures. Their definition of the part subordinate to this takes the seemly to be that which agrees with nature in such a way that moderation and restraint appear in it. Along with the appearance of a gentleman.
We are able to infer that it is that seemliness to which poets aspire. This is often discussed more fully in a different context. We say that poets observe what is seemly when what is said and done is worthy of the role. If Icus or Minos were to say, let them hate, provided that they fear where the father himself is his children's tomb, it would seem unseemly because we believe them to have been just men. When Atreus says it, however, there's loud applause. The words are worthy of his role. The poets, though, will judge what is seemly for each by his role. But nature has imposed on us a role that greatly excels and surpasses that of others creatures.
Thank you.
[00:12:34] Speaker D: So I. I think what he's. What he's getting at here is kind of parallel to what he was talking about a minute ago, where he's saying there's a sense in which seemliness is about sort of honorableness in general, right justice as a whole. But then there's also a. A sense in which seemliness has to do specifically with that ordered beauty of life that Chris and Ethan mentioned. With that notion of restraint, with that notion of doing things appropriately.
And that might be conditioned based on the role.
Right. And so I'm not entirely sure what to make of the distinction here between, I think Aikus and Minos are gods. And then the poets talking about something that he says, let them hate, provided that they fear the father himself is his children's tomb. You know, those wouldn't be considered seemly for a God who is thought to be just right. And speaking as a sort of exemplar of justice, to say. But hey, on the stage, for a poet to be. Or, you know, you know, to be talking and put this into the words of an appropriate speaker or something like that, we can see how it fits in that moment or in that role. Something like that, I think, is what's going on.
But I also. The last point I'll make is just this again.
Continual reference to. In all the discussions of all the virtues, to what is it that makes us different from the animal, from the other animals?
What is it that Is appropriate to human nature.
And so those are some initial thoughts.
[00:14:16] Speaker B: Okay, Ethan, what are your thoughts on that?
[00:14:19] Speaker C: Well, right. I was gonna start with the distinction between man and animal here that Ben just mentioned and that he says this is the excellence of man, or one of the excellences of man. So if the rest of nature is beautiful, well, it receives that beauty from its, you know, from God or from directly. It's sort of programmed or hardwired that way. But human beings have to work at it. And there is a beauty that human beings can achieve, but it's something that has to be cultivated.
And our seemliness, our ability to observe the social graces, to do things properly, to live properly, is something that requires a lot of. Lot of cultivation.
[00:15:12] Speaker B: I would just add a thought with respect to these two senses of seemliness. General seemliness is honorable behavior connected especially with the difference between us and the animals. Presumably, then its violation would be for a human to behave in a way that is more appropriate to animals. To sort of blur the line between man and beast. To act in a beastial way would be unseemly in a very general sense. Nobody should do that.
And then the second more individual type of seemliness Is to behave in a way that agrees with your own nature, such that you can sort of display your gifts in the most appropriate, moderate and restrained way. And presumably, then violation of that more specific seemliness would involve behaving in a way that's not appropriate to you, to who you are, to your office, to your.
To your abilities and gifts. It would be to behave like a different sort of person from the one that you are. A person with a different kind of office, maybe with different duties that impinge upon you. It helps me sometimes to think in terms of the negative of the violation. So two kinds, perhaps also of unseemliness. To behave in a bestial way, or to behave in a way that would be fine for some other person with some other features, but wouldn't be appropriate for you in your concrete circumstances.
Coyle, back to you for comment.
[00:16:39] Speaker A: Yeah, and he's going to go into this in more detail. Right. I don't want to get too far ahead, but the. The idea being that we see in fiction something that's true in. In real life.
[00:16:51] Speaker C: Right.
[00:16:52] Speaker A: So one of the criticisms of the man and Batman movies that came out ago, they're not the sorts of behavior that we expect from those particular characters.
The films are unseemly, not necessarily because they're inherently bad in themselves. They might be fine movies, but Superman doesn't say and do that stuff. Batman doesn't say and do that. So that's kind of what Cicero is doing here. Right.
If you put these lines in that character's mouth, it doesn't work. Same is true of us.
[00:17:26] Speaker B: That's excellent. That's a great comparison. I hadn't thought about that before. I like that.
Ben, I'd like you to read, if you would, chapters 98 and 99. I'll take first comment.
[00:17:40] Speaker C: Okay.
[00:17:41] Speaker D: Poets, therefore, will look to what is suitable and seemly for a huge variety of roles, even wicked ones. But our parts have been given to us by nature.
Since they are ones of constancy, of moderation, of restraint, of a sense of shame. And since the same nature teaches us to be mindful of the way we behave towards other men, it becomes apparent how widespread is not only that seemliness which extends over all that is honourable, but also that which is seen in one part of virtue. For just as the eye is aroused by the beauty of a body. Because of the appropriate arrangement of the limbs. And is delighted just because all its parts are in graceful harmony, so this seemliness shining out in one's life. Arouses the approval of one's fellows. Because of the order and constancy and moderation of every word and action.
Thus we must exercise a respectfulness towards men, both towards the best of them and also towards the rest. To neglect what others think about oneself. Is the mark not only of arrogance. But also of utter laxity. There is a difference between justice and shame. When reasoning about humans.
The part of justice is not to harm a man. That of a sense of shame, not to outrage him. Here is seen most clearly the essence of seemliness. I think it will be understood from this explanation. What kind of thing it is that we call being seemly.
[00:19:09] Speaker B: All right, thank you, Ben.
I would just comment very briefly here. First, the distinction between the kind of lives we live. And the kind of appropriateness and seemliness for us. Is that our author is nature.
And so we ought to behave in accord with nature. The same way that we might say an excellent character in a play should behave According to the vision that an excellent playwright has had. For him to give him just the right kind of lines. Right Lear speaks the way that Lear speaks. The fool speaks as appropriate to the fool.
So again, kind of the stoic sensibility. That to follow nature, to obey the limits and the guides that it sets for you.
And the description here at the end is the part of justice not to harm a man. It is the part of the sense of shame, not to outrage his feelings. And I like that comparison. And he began this whole section by saying it's kind of tough to separate the virtue from virtue and honorableness from seemliness because everything honorable, everything just everything virtuous is seemly as well. But here we have kind of the, the more precise sense of it is that I, I respect your, your person, the integrity of your body by not harming you, that you're good. But I also respect your, your feelings, your sort of social person by not engaging in activity that is not, while not being wrong is perhaps inappropriate, offensive or disgusting. So I think that's, that's a nice way of bringing around the sort of sense of what seemliness is and why it's important as this kind of ornamentation of the.
The self.
Coyle, would you like a second comment? I'll go then to Ethan and Ben.
[00:20:51] Speaker A: Yeah, As a, as we go through this, I think it, it is more shaping up that Cicero is using seemliness as the, the point of contact between virtue or justice and practical action. Right. So how do you, how do you turn these abstract virtues into real world action? Well, seemliness is our guide for that. So if I, if I buy ice cream for my kid, and I know that my kid loves vanilla and hates chocolate and I bring him chocolate ice cream, I have not actually done him a good thing. Right. Even if buying him ice cream is in. Is a virtuous thing to do in some circumstances.
I have not been virtuous there. I've failed to behave in a seemly way.
So, so seemliness is. Is sort of the. The navigator for virtue through the world, at least in this passage. There are other things that he uses later as well.
[00:21:42] Speaker C: Ethan, in thinking in particular of paragraph 98, I'm reminded of Plato's discussion of the poets.
I think this is in book 10 of the Republic where he contrasts the sort of mercurial and uncontrolled character of the mob and various sorts of vulgar people and the, the sereneness of the gentleman. And I think there's something of this in Cicero's discussion of the poets as well. So the poets should portray people as they are so that we can see these different types and we know what certain unseemly characters look like and we can identify them.
But the gentleman that Cicero is raising up here, the one who is to be the statesman, one of the fathers of the nation, is one who has these characteristics, who behaves gracefully, who is always in control of his emotions, who uses that, who displays all of the Graces.
And that's the. Again, this is how the gentleman needs to appear before.
Appear before the people.
[00:23:05] Speaker B: Great Ben.
[00:23:07] Speaker D: Graces is a good. I think a nice, you know, this. People talk about the social graces, you know, do they. Do they have the, you know, I think it's been said that this is the whole point of, you know, manners. I mean, I know there's a kind of class analysis of manners. It's like, let me show you. I'm so much better than you. But this is more of an analysis of manners that would fall along with the idea of manners as they provide us ways of trying to show respect for each other and trying to show that you're not trying to make. We're not trying to make ourselves obnoxious to other people. Right. And we're trying to show respect. So, yeah, I, I am struck. I mean, and I mean back to the sense of shame again, and the concern for what other, for what others think, even if it's not about justice. I thought Coyle's example was a good one. You know, it's not.
You can wrong somebody without doing an injustice to them. Right. According to this analysis, you can wrong somebody simply by not paying sufficient attention to their feelings. Right. Or not paying sufficient attention to their reputation. Right. Or their good name. Or just like you said something, like you said Chris, something that's offensive. You know, you say something or do something that's just.
People find that offensive. You haven't, you know, acted in a seemly way. So it's, it's very interesting. Again, maybe running contrary to a lot of trends in contemporary culture and life is kind of like, I'm going to show you who I am. I'm going to be authentic. I'm going to, you know, I'm going to express my thoughts unrestrainedly. And here the emphasis very much is on, hey, not only don't commit an injustice against somebody, but also don't outrage that person. Don't offend them unnecessarily. Right. There may be. I think all these things can be overridden if there's a time when, you know, you, you have to outrage somebody in order to, you know, be just. Or something like that. But here that, you know, don't, don't unnecessarily offend that. That is a kind of.
A kind of harm that is, or a kind of wrong that fits here. And I think, again, you see, you know, echoes isn't the right word, but versions of this in Paul's admonitions to Christians Live good lives among the pagans. Don't act in a way that's unnecessarily going live at peace with everybody as far as possible. Don't unnecessarily make yourself obnoxious to people.
You ought to respect how people and care how people think about you.
And again, kind of comes into focus a little bit more here.
[00:25:44] Speaker B: Okay, thanks very much. I don't think we'll try reading another chapter before we wrap up, but maybe I'll ask for some concluding thoughts.
Mine is this, especially in light of what you just said, Ben.
I think of one figure who I've been reading a good bit about lately. Rousseau. Kind of the polar opposite of this. The man who will say the offensive thing, who will break convention precisely because it's convention. And in this kind of pre revolutionary spirit, it's simply decadent and corrupt to follow these things in his place and time.
Looks like we're looking at kind of anti. Rousseauvian spirit, or perhaps the spirit against some part of the spirit against which Rousseau was reacting and lashing out in his own work.
Just an observation of mine as a teacher of modern philosophy. Anybody else?
[00:26:32] Speaker C: Yes, on that very point. And I think we've mentioned this before.
So for Cicero, what others might call convention, these are not just conventions, they are ordained by nature. So seemliness as well as the other virtues are ordained by nature. And there's a later passage we may get to eventually where he says, if you consider even the way the human body is made, we get clues just from the way the body is made that certain parts ought to be kept covered.
And so there are.
Nature tells us. Nature at least gives us clues about how we ought to behave.
And that is where our virtues come from. That is where our conventions come from. They're not just things that we made up or that our ancestors made up and that are arbitrary.
[00:27:34] Speaker D: Yeah.
Thinking about Rousseau or people who stand in a different, you know, tradition or perspective, I, I may be wrong about this, but I believe the, the cosmopolitan guy, Diogenes, you know, and the Diogenes cynic. I think it's kind of interesting. I don't know how much to make of this, but that he, he has a more thorough going cosmopolitan than cosmopolitanism than Cicero. Right, Cicero. It does have a kind of concern for, you know, all of we, we have duties to some degree to all human beings, but we also have to. We do have very intense duties to our country, our family and our friends. Right.
And so Diogenes is on the other end of that. He's Also on the other end of this question, right, which is he's the one who is it is said of him that he would commit obscene acts in public, right? Because he's kind of saying, hey, look, I'm not bound by conventional, these are just, you know, conventional mores that don't have anything to do with actual morality. And so these are definitely competing. It's kind of, I wonder if there's a connection between those things. I mean, if I were going to try to spin one out, it might be that, yes, you, you have a kind of duty to your country, a duty to your community, your specific community, and you're to respect the mores of that community. Community. You're to, you know, try to live by them and not do things that are offensive to people, to those mores. Something like that. But that's just kind of interesting.
Coyle.
[00:29:15] Speaker A: Well, and it raises the question of, and this is, this is the question with any, any traditional thinker is going to have to deal with. All of this is great if you live in a generally healthy culture, right? If, if you live in a society with, with decent mores.
What if you don't? Or what if you live in a time of crumbling mores, as Cicero did, right? What, what then?
What does it mean to encourage someone to be seemly when the governing aesthetic is do whatever you want and nothing matters? Well, all of a sudden that's, that's a real problem. What, what would it mean to tell a contemporary American you need, you need to be seemly in your behavior? Well, I have no idea. I, I pity the person who tries to.
[00:30:01] Speaker B: That's a great place, I think, for us to conclude. We're just finished with chapter 99, so we'll pick up next week with chapter 100.
Thanks to all three of my co hosts here, Coyle Neal, Ben Peterson and Ethan Alexander Davy. And thank you for joining us this week for the On Duties podcast. Please subscribe if you want to hear more and like and share this episode with a friend. We'll see you next Wednesday. Thanks for watching.
[00:30:30] Speaker A: Sam.
