Episode Transcript
[00:00:09] Chris Anadale: Hello, welcome to another episode of the Cicero On Duties podcast. We are reading through all of De Officiis with the a rotating cast of scholars from the Ciceronian Society. I'm Chris Anadale and I'm joined today by my co hosts Catherine Bradshaw and Ethan Alexander Davy. If you enjoy our work and would like to spend time with us and like minded people, please consider attending our Spring 2027 conference in Virginia Beach, March 11th to 13th, 2027. Registration is now open and the discounted early bird registration ends January 1st.
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Today we will Continue Reading Book 3 of On Duties where Cicero introduces the need for a rule of procedure to for judging the honorable and the beneficial Catherine, I'd like you to start us off by reading chapters 19 and 20, if you don't mind.
[00:01:07] Katherine Bradshaw: What is it then, that sometimes tends to raise a doubt and seems to need consideration? Such occasions arise, I believe, whenever there is a doubt over the nature of the action that one is considering.
For often the occasion arises when something that is generally and customarily considered to be dishonorable is found not to be so. Let me suggest, as an example, something that can be more widely applied. What greater crime can there be than to kill not merely another man, but even a close friend? Surely, then, anyone who kills a tyrant, although he is a close friend, has committed himself to crime. But it does not seem so to the Roman people, which deems that deed the fairest of all splendid deeds. Did the beneficial therefore overcome honorableness? No, indeed, for honorableness followed upon what benefited it. Therefore, in order that we may pronounce judgment without error, if ever that which we call beneficial seems to conflict with that which we understand to be honorable, a rule of procedure must be established. If we follow this with comparing courses, we shall never fall away from duty.
Moreover, this rule of procedure will be highly consistent with the reasoning and teaching of the Stoics. I am following their reasoning in these books for this reason. Both the old academics and your peripatetics, who were once the same as the academics, prefer that which is honorable to that which seems beneficial. These things are discussed, however, more nobly, by those for whom, if anything, is honorable, the same thing seems beneficial, and nothing seems beneficial that is not honorable, than by those who for whom there is something honorable but not beneficial, and something beneficial but not honorable. In any case, our academy grants us great freedom so that we may be justified in defending whatever seems most persuasive. But I return to my rule of procedure.
[00:03:03] Chris Anadale: Thank you, Catherine. I'LL lead off comment here by noting a really two paragraphs and two interesting points Cicero announces here. As I said in introducing this episode, we need a rule of procedure. We need a formula, we need some way of deciding the issue. And so that's what he's going to provide. But first he speaks about the need for it and about the acceptability of it. And his example, it just always strikes me to think about he's writing this less than six months after the death of Caesar the same year. Right. So his example is one that will be of wider applicability. Right. Certainly, to kill a tyrant is to do something honorable because of the great benefit to the city, to the republic.
And as the footnote observes in this edition, Cicero slightly exaggerates the unanimity of the Roman people. But that's his favorite example.
There can be conflicts between what is honorable and what seems to be beneficial. How do we resolve these? We need a rule, need a formula. We need some sort, something memorable that we can then apply in the cases of our life.
And then he goes on to compare this to the academic and the Aristotelian peripatetic idea, really, I think, noting that, yes, they would want a formula as well. This is entirely compatible with multiple schools of philosophy, with a little bit of a push there at the end that our academic system, which is Cicero's favorite one, over the one that I think young Marcus is studying, is superior. Ethan, what do you say?
[00:04:41] Ethan Alexander-Davey: Well, yeah, I'm not sure I have much to add here.
I am struck by the same line in this, that the example to illustrate the rule is that it is correct to kill a tyrant, even if that tyrant was your friend, and the benefit to the public has to outweigh, in that case, the relationship of friendship with the tyrant.
I'm reminded of a later formulation of this in John of Salisbury in his book The Polycraticus, a 12th century political thinker in England, he says that it is correct, it is just to kill a tyrant, but it is dishonorable to kill him in certain ways. For instance, by poisoning. To poison a tyrant would be dishonorable, but to confront him directly in the way that Caesar was, well, that would be honorable.
But yeah, Cicero is going to insist that these two things, what is honorable and what is beneficial, must be compatible. And that's why we need a formula to help us sort out and make sure that the two things are compatible in every case.
[00:05:59] Katherine Bradshaw: Yes, and the interesting thing with the different schools of philosophy that he brings up, he does put in that little, oh, well, the academic allows me a little more freedom than maybe your peripatetic or the Stoic.
But he also, again, we keep coming back to Cicero is not a Stoic, but he has great respect for the Stoics up to a point, and here is no exception. Because that bit when he's talking about, oh, those who say that the honorable and the beneficial can never conflict talk about it better than the ones who say, oh, there is such a thing that's honorable but not beneficial, and there is such a thing that is beneficial but not honorable.
It's of course an oblique reference to the Stoics are kind of known. And this is one of the things that some non Stoics tend to have problems with, is that for the Stoics there is nothing honorable that is not beneficial and the other way around.
So even things that we would consider very, very bad are not bad for the Stoics, because if you have the right attitude, then everything is good, even pain, even great suffering, et cetera, et cetera.
Whereas the Peripatetics, Epicureans, a lot of the other schools will say, no, no, no, it is possible for the honorable and the beneficial to conflict and not be reconcilable. And of course, Cicero is making more of a Stoic case here.
So it is interesting how kind of, to use a modern term, ecumenical Cicero often is in the philosophic world.
[00:07:40] Chris Anadale: Yeah, I think that's right.
It's interesting to see, for me to see Cicero not sort of thinking of himself as kind of a frontline philosopher, still saying all of my practical works sort of unite are acceptable to many different kinds of philosophy. So I'll read the next section, chapters 21 and 22 for Ethan to lead comment on.
Now then, for one man to take something from another and to increase his own advantage at the cost of another's disadvantage is more contrary to nature, than death, than poverty, than pain. And then anything else that may happen to his body or external possessions in the first place, it destroys the common life and fellowship of men. For if we are so minded that any one man will use theft or violence against another for his own profit, then necessarily the thing that is most of all in accordance with nature will be shattered. That is the fellowship of the human race.
Suppose that each limb were disposed to think that it would be able to grow strong by taking over to itself its neighbor's strength. Necessarily the whole body would weaken and die in the same way if each one of us were to snatch for himself the advantages other men have and take what he could for his own profit, then necessarily fellowship and community among men would be overthrown.
It is permitted to us. Nature does not oppose it, that each man should prefer to secure for himself rather than for another anything connected with the necessity necessities of life. However, nature does not allow us to increase our means, our resources and our wealth by despoiling others.
[00:09:31] Ethan Alexander-Davey: All right, so we are on familiar ground here. We have another law of nature, or Cicero's natural law. Nature's prescriptions for us that to preserve human society we cannot use other people, damage other people to serve our own advantage. And I think Caesar is. The figure of Caesar is still present in this paragraph as well, whom we have heard to have done a lot of these things, to use the power of the state to transfer property from one group to another, to treat the people's property as the spoils of war and give it to his friends. So, again, this is familiar territory for Cicero about our duties to other human beings. Our first duty is not to harm others for our own advantage.
[00:10:31] Katherine Bradshaw: Yeah, as you said, Ethan, this is easy to see various places that we've already covered that this. This is referred to.
There is also this connection that we may. We. We saw a few sections ago about we have right treatment of other people and the fellowship of the human race. And if we. If we take away that, then everything breaks down and society just goes to the dogs.
This is so important for Cicero's grounding of just duties in general and also for the rest of this book, of course, because there is that foundation of the fellowship of the human race that you can't go beyond that. You can't act as if that doesn't work without damaging things. And the metaphor of the body, this is something that we as Christians tend to associate with the Apostle Paul, but it's not original to the Apostle Paul either.
It's in.
Famously recorded in Livy's History of Ancient Rome, where there was a.
The plebeians left Rome and refused to do anything and just sat on a hill until one of the senators went up and said, oh, but we are all the body, and we are all members of the body, and therefore we need you and you need us. And everyone works for each other's benefit. It's not that the patricians are working for their own benefit, they're working for everyone's benefit. And so this is a very common way of thinking of the state and of human nature in general, of communities for the Romans. And Cicero is using this very effectively with the idea that the parts cannot Go to war with each other, otherwise the entire will weaken and die.
[00:12:30] Chris Anadale: I'm struck again by something that. Ethan, you had just said, that the foundation of the common good is this.
This the foundation of private property as well. So if. If you want, like the Stoics, to live according to nature, well, what does nature require? Nature requires us to live in community. He'll speak later on about people not retreating into solitude to live the life of the solitary philosopher with all of its pleasures, but neglecting the common interests of mankind. But what is most opposed to the common good? Well, it's what's most opposed to the common fellowship of the human race. And that is thievery, that is stealing, that is aggressing against other people, appropriating their stuff for your benefit, harming them in just that way. And it is kind of shocking the way he rhetorically introduces this passage. This is more contrary to nature than death.
Right to kill a man is one thing. To steal somebody else's property is, in a sense, even more contrary to human nature. Because human nature is about us living together.
So he really is pulling out all the stops. He's sparing.
Sparing no rhetorical expense in emphasizing that property and respect for property is at the foundation of social life. The person who aggresses against it is your deepest level threat, too. The state. And Ethan, as you pointed out as well, he's certainly thinking of Cicero and Cicero's cronies and the expropriation of property and the maltreatment of citizens in his own time, in this very same year, in recent months.
Let's turn next to chapters 23 and 24. Ethan, would you please read those for us?
[00:14:20] Ethan Alexander-Davey: The same thing is established not only in nature, that is, in the law of nations, but also in the laws of individual peoples through which the political community of individual cities is maintained. One is not allowed to harm another for the sake of one's own advantage.
For the laws have as their object and desire that the bonds between citizens should be unharmed. If anyone tears them apart, they restrain him by death, by exile, by chains, or by fine nature's reason itself, which is divine. And human law, achieves this object to a far greater extent. Whoever is willing to obey it, everyone will obey it. Who wants to live in accordance with nature will never act so as to seek what is another's, nor to appropriate for himself something that he has taken from someone else. For loftiness and spirit and greatness of spirit, and indeed friendliness, justice and liberality are far more in accordance with Nature than pleasure, than life, than riches. Indeed, to disdain these when comparing them with the common benefit and value them as nothing is the mark of a great and lofty spirit. On the other hand, for anyone to take from someone else for the sake of his own advantage is more contrary to nature than death or pain or anything else of the type.
[00:15:47] Katherine Bradshaw: And here we have more of the statements of this is the most awful thing possible.
The it's it. It does sound odd to modern errors, particularly post.
Again we keep going back to Machiavelli post Machiavelli where he says yes, you should be generous with other people's money, but don't be generous with your own because if, if you are, if you are a, an elite, if you are a leader, because then you will run out and then you will have to steal from other people and then that will make you hated.
So there is but again the, the laws have as their object and desire that the bonds between citizens should be unharmed.
It's such a non modern way of looking at law that I think for us moderns it's laws are there to protect us from each other as opposed to fostering bonds of community and ties together that are meant to create not just being able to live together in the same community, but also good fellowship, good feeling amongst the citizens is supposed to be encouraged and something that I think as moderns we don't necessarily associate with natural ways of doing things.
[00:17:17] Chris Anadale: Yeah, I think that's right. And I think of course, you know, a good deal of 17th century social contract thinking as well, taking us back to the individual, the individual interests and the way that common good, the common interests are sort of ultimately to serve and preserve the individual interests. Cicero seems to, while still respecting the integrity of the individual, situate him really strongly in this communal thing, this common thing that we all share, in which the good of it is this abstract fellowship of the human race. And I note he adds here as we got, that the superlative crime against the common good, the public good, is theft or aggression. The superlative virtue is to be so far above these things because your spirit is lofty, it is far more in accordance with nature. You wish to live in conformity with nature, well then pursue greatness of spirit, friendliness, justice and liberality.
This is more natural to man even than pleasure, life and riches.
So to regard pleasure, life and riches with disdain because you are so much better than those things is the mark of a truly magnificent human being. So again, this is the gentleman statesman speaking about the philosophy, the culture, the political culture, of the.
The gentleman class, it seems to me, and sort of calling Marcus to avoid the expropriating wealth from others above all things, and seek to be above even considerations of pleasure and the like. And then you will be the most natural. Then you will be living according to nature, just as the Stoics, just as all the other philosophers say to do
[00:18:59] Ethan Alexander-Davey: right. And the gentleman statesman should prefer to. Should prefer death or pain to the shame of not living in the right way, of not showing friendliness, justice and liberality, which are the things which sustain and, as Catherine said, foster community and good relations among men.
So the man of truly lofty spirit would rather die, would rather suffer pain, than allow himself to do any of these things which are, as he says, contrary to nature, which dissolve the bonds of community.
[00:19:41] Chris Anadale: Very good. Next we have chapters 25 and 26. Catherine, would you please read those?
[00:19:48] Katherine Bradshaw: Certainly.
The great Hercules undertook extreme toils and troubles in order to protect and assist all races of men.
His reputation among mankind, recalling his kind services, has placed him in the council of the heavenly ones. It is more in accordance with nature to imitate him in this, if it can be done, than to live in solitude, even though you might be not only free from trouble, but also enjoying very great pleasures, endowed with plentiful resources and excelling, too, in beauty and strength. And so the men with the best and most brilliant talent far prefer that life to this. Consequently, a man who is obedient to nature cannot harm another man again. If a man acts violently against someone else in order to secure some advantage himself, he either considers that he is doing nothing contrary to nature, or else judges that death, poverty, pain, and the loss of children, relations or friends are more to be avoided than the doing of an injustice to someone. If he thinks that acting violently against other men involves doing nothing contrary to nature, then how can you argue with him? For he takes all of the human out of a human.
If, on the other hand, he thinks that such actions should be avoided, but that death, poverty and pain are far worse, his error is that he counts a failing of body or fortune as more serious than any failing of spirit. Therefore, all men should have this one object, that the benefit of each individual and the benefit of all together should be the same. If anyone arrogates it to himself, all human intercourse will be dissolved.
[00:21:28] Chris Anadale: All right.
Well, here, of course, the great Hercules as a model also, as if you wish to be in accordance with nature. Again, really pushing this. This is what the Greek philosophers, what the Stoics, would all tell you. The good man, the Virtuous man, the excellent lives according to nature. But what does that mean? Does that mean being a cynic? Does it mean. And being virtuously living according to sort of the abstract natural law?
What does it require? Well, here's Cicero playing all of the nature cards out of his hand. If you want to be natural, do this. If you want to avoid the crimes against nature, avoid this.
I'm really impressed in this first paragraph with, again, Cicero.
Something has happened in the three or three and a half centuries between Plato and Cicero's writing this.
The idea of the philosopher king retreating from the world, taking all of his wisdom and all of his wealth and all of his beauty and all of his pleasure, and living a solitary life, sort of away from the rest of society because they don't deserve him. Cicero's really got that sort of stuck in his mind as a thing that he does not want Marcus to fall into the trap of.
So you could live in solitude, free from trouble, et cetera, et cetera. But the truly most brilliant and talented will prefer the life of. Of the life of Hercules, extreme toil, serving the entire race of mankind.
So the man who is obedient to nature will never harm another man. Maybe the worry here is that you retreat into solitude because you're afraid that if you have to engage in politics, you will harm and be harmed. And Cicero is saying, well, one, if you're just, you'll never harm. And if you are excellent, you'll never fear being harmed. You'll bear the pains and burdens and even death as the price of being excellent in the public are.
[00:23:20] Ethan Alexander-Davey: Reader, I was just going to add, and I was going to say before that, I also, when we were reading this, Paul's epistles came to mind, especially the passages about, you know, the ear and the eye and the parts of the body, how they all need each other. And so it is with the members of the body of Christ. And I wasn't aware of the reference to Livy that Catherine brought up, but this keeps coming back here, right? So the.
And this is also a theme in medieval political thought as well, following Paul, that the great men must not say to the lesser, I have no need of thee. They're all in need of each other. All the parts of the body politic are in need of each other. And so for the great to take themselves into exile and take themselves and all of their talents and resources out of the community is a betrayal of that community. And so that's why he emphasizes this. The great have some of the greatest duties to the rest of the community, and to never allow themselves to say that they have no need of the lesser members.
[00:24:38] Katherine Bradshaw: That interdependence is definitely something very high in Cicero's mind.
There is also the. I think. I think again, because of our culture's tendency toward isolation, especially after lockdown, that this again also strikes us as a little odd, whether we've read Plato or not, because there is this sense that, oh, well, it would be better to be able to just be in one's own little world, whether that is a technological world, whether that is a real world that is in one's own place, whether that is even like not a community, but one's own very, very small nuclear family without the interaction with the rest of society.
That seems to be a very modern thought, that that is good and then even something to aspire to. But. But then Cicero is saying, no, that's not a human way to live, because humans need to interact with each other. This is again a very Roman thought, because there is.
Humans get compared to bees a lot in the ancient Roman world that they need to live in community, they need to live in the larger. They are social creatures. We are not like eagles.
Vara. I think it's Varro who says humans are not like eagles that live solitary. They're like bees who are.
No, I'm sorry, it's. Bees are. Bees are like human beings. They are not like eagles.
So there is then, for the one who then takes it further and is violent, takes the human out of being human, it's again that very strong. This is what humanity is, and this is what it is not.
Idea for Cicero.
[00:26:39] Chris Anadale: We live in a society, right? As the saying goes rather recently.
Our Last chapters are 27 and 28. I will read those.
Furthermore, if nature prescribes that one man should want to consider the interests of another, whoever he may be, for the very reason that he is a man, it is necessary, according to the same nature, that what is beneficial to all is something common. If that is so, then we are all constrained by one and the same law of nature. And if that also is true, then we are certainly forbidden by the law of nature from acting violently against another person. The first claim is indeed true, therefore the last is true.
Now, surely it is absurd to say, as some do, that they would not deprive a parent or brother of anything for their own advantage, but that there is another rationale for the rest of the citizens. Such men decree that no justice and no fellowship exist among citizens for the sake of common benefit. An Opinion that breaks up all fellowship in the city.
There are others again who say that account should be taken of other citizens, but deny it in the case of foreigners. Such men tear apart the common fellowship of the human race.
When that is removed, then kindness, liberality, goodness and justice are utterly destroyed.
Those who destroy them must be judged irreverent, even in respect of the immortal gods. For the fellowship among mankind that they overturn was established by the gods. And the tightest bond of that fellowship is that it be thought more contrary to nature for one man to deprive another for the sake of his own advantage than to endure every disadvantage, whether it affects externals or, or the body or even the spirit itself, so long as it is free from injustice. For that single virtue is the mistress and queen of virtues.
[00:28:46] Ethan Alexander-Davey: So here again we are in familiar territory. And I think he's going to return later in this book to discuss what we owe to the different groups of humanity. Right, so there's the duties to the human race as a whole. There's duty to family, there's duty to fellow citizens. And these duties are different in some ways.
But we do owe something to all.
There is no part of the human race to whom we owe nothing.
And so this again, this is his, his conception of natural law, which requires us that we owe something even to enemies, as he'll later discuss when he answers these questions about war.
And the gods preside over this. This is a rule established by the gods for the fellowship of all of humanity, even given that there are differing degrees of obligations to different people.
[00:29:53] Katherine Bradshaw: Yes, and the degree is again very important to Cicero. We haven't gotten to Augustine yet with the ordo amoris, the order of loves, but there is sort of the as far as we can get without divine revelation piece here.
I think it's interesting that for Cicero there is no such thing as saying, okay, for this group I can be just, but for this other group I don't have to be.
And again, that's a very virtue ethics way of thinking of if you are going to be unjust to one group, then that means you are the sort of person who will be unjust, and therefore you're breaking down the rest of the groups.
And so because all of this is intertwined, one must be just all the time because it would be impious to do anything else. And because Ethan, as you brought up, this is established by the gods, for Cicero, he then takes it to, oh, so if I break this, then it is impiety, it is action against the gods, because this is just disrespecting, breaking the laws that they established. And so there is. There are different spheres, but they all are connected. So there's no such thing as a hermetically sealed anything.
[00:31:12] Chris Anadale: I was thinking in reading this and listening to the commentary on it, that Cicero maybe is inviting us to rethink something that's been discussed much of the past decade or so. The friend, enemy distinction in politics, where I draw a line and I say my obligations are to those on this side of the line, and the other side of the line is the enemy, we define ourselves on this side against the enemy. That's a sort of crude, simplistic way of putting it. But Cicero here, if there's a line to be drawn between friends and enemies, it's between friends, friends of nature and friends of humanity and enemies of nature and enemies of humanity. It's between those who do justice or try to, and those who commit the worst of injustices by breaking up the social bond, by undermining the state, every state, in every way. And so he's insisting here that the law of nature is universal. It applies to everyone.
Everyone is obligated by it. And our obligations, as you pointed out, Ethan, extend to everyone. So there is no way of saying, as he says in chapter 28, well, my family, but. But not outside my family or my citizens, but not outside of the city, not outside of the polity, that if nature is the basis of this political bond, then this natural affection, this natural communion of the human race is the natural basis out of which all of that grows, all of the political obligation and activity grows. And to offend against that is, as he says, the worst of all things. Worse than death, worse than suffering, worse than murder.
So that's the way in which to think properly about nature and even about divine law, as it turns out, always do justice, always hold to upholding and supporting and protecting this social bond.
That brings us to the end of the passages we're going to read. For today, you have been listening to the Cicero on Duties podcast, a production of the Ciceronian Society. Thanks to my co hosts today, Ethan Alexander Davy and Catherine Bradshaw.
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