Cicero On Duties, Episode 44 - Honor vs Apparent Benefit

Episode 44 • November 04, 2026 • 00:36:26
Cicero On Duties, Episode 44 - Honor vs Apparent Benefit
Cicero On Duties
Cicero On Duties, Episode 44 - Honor vs Apparent Benefit

Nov 04 2026 | 00:36:26

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Show Notes

Judging cases where the beneficial seems to conflict with the honorable. With hosts Josh Bowman, Chris Anadale, and Katherine Bradshaw.
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IN THIS EPISODE
Book 3, Chapters 40-49
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INDEX
0:00 Introduction to Episode 44
2:23 Book 3 Ch 40-42, Honor vs Benefit to Oneself
10:11 Book 3 Ch 43-44, Honor vs Benefit to Friends
18:38 Book 3 Ch 45-46, Honor vs Benefit to Public Affairs
27:07 Book 3 Ch 47-49, Themistocles Example
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MENTIONED IN THIS EPISODE
2027 Colloquium on Uncivil Discourse, January 23-24 in Scottsdale, AZ: https://ciceroniansociety.org/conferences/colloquium2027/

2027 Spring Conference in Virginia Beach, VA, March 11-13, Registration is now open: https://ciceroniansociety.org/conference-spring/2027-conference-registration/

Apply to enroll in Logres Institute courses: https://www.logresinstitute.org/enroll-populi
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HOSTS
Joshua Bowman is Executive Director of the Ciceronian Society, and earned a PhD in politics from the Catholic University of America.

Christopher Anadale is podcast editor for the Ciceronian Society, and Associate Professor of Philosophy at Mount St. Mary's University in Emmitsburg, Maryland.

Katherine L. Bradshaw is a Latin and Greek Fellow with the Ancient Language Institute and a Ph.D. student in Humanities through Faulkner University. She has an M.A. in Classics from the University of Maryland and an M.A. in English from the George Washington University.
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TEXTS
Translation we read from: https://www.cambridge.org/us/universitypress/subjects/politics-international-relations/texts-political-thought/cicero-duties?format=PB&isbn=9780521348355

Another (free) translation: https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/cicero-on-moral-duties-de-officiis
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The Ciceronian Society encourages and equips Christian Scholars as they serve the church. To learn more, visit https://ciceroniansociety.org/

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Music: No. 4 Piano Journey, by Esther Abrami

#cicero #philosophy #ethics

Chapters

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Episode Transcript

[00:00:09] Josh Bowman: Hello, everyone, and welcome to the Cicero on Duties podcast, a production of the Ciceronian Society. I'm Josh Bowman, executive director of the Ciceronean Society, and we're so glad you're here. We have come a long way this year reading through almost all of Cicero's magnum opus, De Officiis. We're using the Cambridge Text in History in the History of Political Thought edition. If you want to read along with us, there are also free versions and translations online. We've had a lot of great responses to this particular series, and I hope you're enjoying it. Is there another book by Cicero you'd like us to read through and talk through? Because we have no intention of stopping once this is done or, you know, consider letting us know about other books in texts. Great, great texts in the history of Western thought. And, and we would maybe look at those as well. You know, I've thought about, for example, Machiavelli has come up quite a bit in this particular show. Should we go to the Prince? That could be fun. I don't know if any of us know Italian, but I'm sure we can figure something out. Well, thank you so much for joining us. I want to give you a couple quick things. So the Logras Institute for Classical Liberal Studies enrollment for that is now open and going strong. If you enjoy conversations like this and want to get a certificate in one of the Logres Institute's programs, head over there. Got two events coming up this spring, one January 23rd in Scottsdale, Arizona, on Uncivil Discourse. I'll be speaking at that as well as a few other people. Registration is free and is open now. You can go ahead and look at that on our website. We also have the spring conference, March 11th through the 13th in Virginia Beach. Maybe by the time this publishes, I'll have the schedule posted. Probably not, but I'm getting, I'm getting close, so we'll have that soon. Thank you so much again for joining us. We are in book three of Deificis and we're starting in chapter 40. I will read and then Catherine will comment after me. Oh, by the way, I should introduce my co host in case you're, you're new here. This is Chris Anadale, professor of Philosophy at Mount St. Mary's University, and Catherine Bradshaw of the Ancient Language Institute. A Latin fellow, right? That's your, that's your title. Do I remember it right? [00:02:18] Katherine Bradshaw: Latin and Greek fellow. [00:02:19] Josh Bowman: Latin and Greek fellow. All right, let's go. Chapter 40. But now let me return to my subject. Many cases arise in which an appearance of benefit may trouble the spirit, that is, when one might deliberate not whether to abandon honorableness, because the benefit is great, for that is certainly wicked, but rather whether it may be possible to do that which seems beneficial in a way that is not dishonorable. Brutus deposed his colleague Collatinus from his command. It could seem that he acted unjustly, for Collatinus had been Brutus ally and assistant in his councils when he expelled the kings. The leading men, however, had adopted the policy of removing Superbus relations, the name of the Tarquins and and the memory of the monarchy. The thing that was beneficial, namely to consider the interests of the country, was for that reason honorable, and thus ought to have been agreeable even to Collatinus himself. Therefore, benefit took its strength from honorableness, without which it would not even have been beneficial. It was not so, however, in the case of the king who founded the city. For the appearance of benefit drove his spirit. And when it seemed more beneficial to him to rule alone than with someone else, he killed his brother. He abandoned both familial obligation and humanity in order to secure something that seemed beneficial but was not. And to present the appearance of being honorable, he put forward the pretext of the wall, which was neither persuasive nor indeed serviceable. He did wrong, then, and I speak with all the respect due to him as Quirinius or as Romulus. However, we are not to neglect benefits to ourselves and surrender them to others when we ourselves need them. Rather, each should attend to what benefits him himself, so far as may be done without injustice to another. Among Chrysippus, many neat remarks was the following. When a man runs in the stadium, he ought to struggle and strive with all his might to be victorious. The but he ought not to trip his fellow competitor or to push him over. Similarly, in life it is not unfair for anyone to seek whatever may be useful to him. But it is not just to steal from another. [00:04:46] Katherine Bradshaw: The Romans have such a complicated relationship with their founding myths. The so this is. This is a very typical kind of Roman commentary on Romulus, the Romulus story. Because, of course, the Romulus story is that Romulus and Remus quarreled over Remus jumping over the wall of Rome and making fun of it. And then Romulus kills him for this. And as Cicero says, that is neither a convincing nor a proper reason for such actions. And so he's attributing it to just ambition on Romulus's part. Livy does not go quite that far. Livy just says, ah, this is Shrouded in the mists of time. I'm not sure if this actually happened this way. If it did, it was really bad, but I'm not sure that it actually happened this way. And Cicero has to be careful here because when he says, I'm giving him the proper respect, either as Romulus or as Quirinius. Quirinius is a divinity for the Romans, so we have to be careful not to criticize the gods. Quirinius is just Romulus's other name after he becomes divinized. So. But the Collatinus Brutus situation is also complicated because Livy, and Livy's after Cicero, but he's dealing with the same historical tradition. So Livy says that it was wrong of Brutus to banish Collatinus, who was his co consul, as the first pair of consuls in Rome. But Cicero says, no, it wasn't because Collatinus was a Tarquin and all the Tarquins had to go. So again, the Romans, the Romans don't quite know what to do with their founding myths. They, they. They're their founding myths, they're the ancestors. We should respect them. But there's a lot of really iffy stuff back there. And so Cicero is doing his best to again, respect the tradition while also saying what is proper. [00:06:48] Chris Anadale: I was struck, reading this by the fact that in what looked like even an equally dodgy case, you know, to the Romulus case, Cicero approves of the banishment of Collatinus on the grounds that it was what was necessary for the good of the country. So doing what is good for one's country is both honorable and beneficial. In fact, the honor comes from the great benefit, and even Collatinus himself should have agreed. Yes, it's in the national interest that I should be banished. The city can't prosper while I'm here. I should accept this, even though it seems to be very disadvantageous to me. So it does look like Cicero is converging these two here. What is honorable and what is beneficial. It was that it was so beneficial to the city that doing it was honorable, even though it required him to turn against his friend and to do what would, to a shallow analysis, look like it was a bad thing or a dishonorable thing. So that. And, and then the final advice that you know, of course, great quoting from Chrysippus. Well, you know, be excellent, run in the foot race, attempt to win, don't trip your fellow competitor. Do what is fair, stick to the honorable while seeking the beneficial. Seems to be Cicero's advice. [00:08:05] Josh Bowman: You just imagine Machiavelli reading that and be like, why don't trip? Just trip them all. What are you doing? You know, that's how you win. And again, I think the interesting thing about Machiavelli is I don't think in the context of a race, would he say that. Probably not. But in this context of politics. Yeah. If you can trip him up, why on earth would you not do it? This is just what you have to do. And Cicero just does not see it that way. And I think there are two interesting things here, and one of them was brought out by what Catherine was saying is Cicero is modeling, and he does this throughout the book and other books as well, a relationship to traditional. Right. Ciceronean society. Our tagline is tradition, place and things divine. When we say tradition, we don't mean that. We look at it with a kind of reverence that is void of criticism. Right. That there are parts of our tradition we're not proud of that we can learn from. And I think that's what Cicero is looking at here, or parts where it's difficult and ambiguous whether it's mythological or otherwise. I think Cicero is modeling that tradition is very much part of who we are. It's a teacher. And there's not a lot of simple black and white answers here, at least from Cicero's perspective. I think you could say that Romulus was not that great, But I think that's pretty clear, but certainly impressive. The other thing I saw here is, you know, the. And maybe this is taking it too far, but maybe kind of a proto harm principle. You know, there's lots of quote unquote, classical liberalism in Cicero and other authors have brought this out, but I think you're seeing that in some ways here. Look, it's okay to win. It's okay to pursue beneficiaries, but don't run over people on your way there. Right. It's that I don't think he would take it as far as John Stuart Mill. No. But I think he would at least agree in part. Like, there is a way to pursue benefit without all this. So with that, we should go on to. Catherine. You can read chapter 43 and 44. [00:10:11] Katherine Bradshaw: All right. Another area where duties are greatly confused is friendships. Here it is contrary to duty either not to grant what you rightly may or to grant what is unfair. There is, however, some brief and easy advice available for all this sort of case. Such things as appear beneficial. Honors, riches, pleasures, and things of that kind should never be preferred to friendship. However, the good man will never, for the sake of a friend, act contrary to the Republic, to a sworn oath, or to good faith. He will not do so, even if he is a judge over his friends. For he lays aside the role of a friend when he assumes that of a judge. He will grant to friendship no more than than that he would prefer his friend's case to be true, and that he would accommodate him over the time for pleading the suit insofar as the laws allow. Indeed, when he has to pronounce the verdict under oath, he should remember that he is calling as his witness a God, which is to say, as I judge it, his own mind. For that is the most divine thing that the God himself gives to man. It is therefore a splendid custom that we have received from our forefathers, if only we would maintain it of making requests of the judge, provided that he can do the thing without breaking faith. A request of this form is appropriate to the type of concessions that, as I just said now, might honorably be made by a judge to a friend. For the kind of friendships in which everything that friends wish must be done should not be thought friendships at all, but rather conspiracies. [00:11:48] Chris Anadale: It seems here we have advice about friendship from a man who's devoted to a philosophical ideal of friendship at a time, time when the Republic is collapsing and when everything seems to be up for grabs and doing good by your friends. In fact, using political power to steal property to give to your friends is the mark of a powerful and excellent, a magnificent man, and one who attracts the most praise and the most followers. And so we have here a pattern we see often in Cicero, a general rule. People are confused about friendship. It is contrary to duty not to give what you rightly may so give to your friends, when you are able to. To withhold from your friends when you could give to them is a fault, or to grant what is unfair, what violates justice, what is wrong, what is bad for them, or which is bad, sort of generally. And then we have. If we've read on friendship, we recognize a similar hierarchy of duties. There are things to which friendship is superior. You should prefer friendship to honors, riches, pleasures, the like worldly goods. So friendship is superior to all of those. But there are things to which friendship is inferior. You should never prefer friendship to your duties, to the Republic, to the public good, to the office which you hold. So we have this kind of upholding of a rule of law among all things that are not dishonorable or contrary to the law, contrary to morality, Friendship is the superlative good to which all other things should be subordinate. So I give my wealth to my friends, I share my honor with my friends, but I don't break the law for my friends. I don't steal from my friends and the like. That all seems very, very Ciceronian in just this small two chapter package. [00:13:31] Josh Bowman: Yeah, and I like that this part ends with essentially a definition of conspiracy which if I to rephrase what he is saying here. A conspiracy is when people who think they're friends get together and just do whatever benefits them, regardless of the law, regardless of the country. This is the conspiracy. You're not friends, you're not, you're just co conspirators. The, the inner coil. Neil who sometimes is on here comes out me and said like I feel like it's co conspirators could be friends here in some place. I'm not saying the conspiratorial attitude is okay, but I'm saying it's. I feel like you could, you could be in on that. Which I think is, is interesting. I also think these things that are inferior to. Sorry, superior to friendship with the, the Republic. A sworn oath or a good faith. A sworn oath or a good faith is, is interesting to me. But the, the Republic. You know, why I love my country, but I certainly love my friends more than I love my country. I think Cicero would find that reprehensible perhaps. Right. You know, if I had to choose between, you know, which is a weird choice between my friends and my country. I mean, I don't even know. I can't even think of an example in which that, that's a thing. But I'm going to choose my friends in my mind. That is the right, the right attitude. And throughout this, this whole book there's always this, you know, the Republic or, or this. And, and when in doubt, choose the Republic. I can't even think of an example where Cicero would choose the Republic, would choose something over the Republic. But it seems a little, to me, I guess it seems a little dangerous to a point. And I'll leave that there. The other part that I like is this whole notion of the divine reason. Of course, very stoic idea. Your mind is part of divine reason. That's the judge. The divine judge. What's. What has to be fun for him, I suppose, is that what do we do when all these divine minds disagree with each other? You know, God is all over the place. If your mind is divine, what, what is God up to right now if they're different gods? I guess I could see that. But if it's a divine spirit, divine essence, but not attached to a particular God, I think there's, there's, there's a lot of room for interpretation there, but I think, I think that's, those are some thoughts I had, Catherine. [00:16:13] Katherine Bradshaw: Yeah, and I think, Josh, going back to your first point, what we're running up against here is Cicero has a different view of the Republic than I think most of us moderns do. When we think of the res publica, we tend to think of the modern state. And that's a concept that would be completely foreign to Cicero. When he says the Republic, he's thinking of, you know, how earlier he talks about the fellowship of mankind. The Republic for him is the expression locally of the fellowship of mankind. And so for someone to go against the Republic, it's kind of the, the clearest expression for Cicero of going against that fellowship. And so we are going to get actually to a. Later, later we're going to get to an example where Cicero actually does say, maybe it's a case by case basis. Let's, let's, let's see. So we will get there. But yeah, it's a funky thing for us moderns with our ideas about the country and the state, to read an author like Cicero, who has no concept of the modern state and all of its apparatus when he talks about the Republic. Now, yes, I think I might not always go with Cicero on the cases that he says the Republic is more important, but I think the overarching principle is coming from a different spot than someone now who would say, no, your loyalty should be to the state first and then to friendship, depending on things where they, where they are. And of course, Cicero has written a whole treatise on friendship, as you mentioned, Chris, but also it's a very philosophical, very Aristotelian way of think looking at friendship. And part of the whole point of Da Maketia on friendship is that friendship is not just a tit for tat exchange of favors. It's more than that, it's greater than that. It's more noble than that. [00:18:30] Chris Anadale: Very good. I'll take the next reading. I think I'll read chapters 45 and 46 for Josh to comment on. I am speaking, of course, about the common sort of friendships, for no such thing would happen among wise and perfect men. There is a story which reveals the spirit of the friendship between Pythagoreans, Daemon and Phintheus, when the tyrant Dionysius decreed that one of them should die on a certain day, and the one whom he had condemned to death begged a few days in order to entrust his family to the care of others. The other stood as BAAL for his safe return. If his friend had not come back, he himself would have had to die. When the friend returned on the appointed day, the tyrant marveled at his faithfulness and begged that they enroll him as a third partner in their friendship. In friendships, then what? When that which seems beneficial is compared with that which is honorable, let the appearance of benefit lie low and let honorableness prevail. On the other hand, when something that is not honorable is demanded within a friendship, let pious faithfulness be preferred to friendship. In that way, the selection of duty for which we are searching will be achieved. In public affairs, wrong is very often done because of the appearance of benefit. An example is our own destruction of Corinth. The Athenians were even harsher, for they decreed that the Agentians, Aans. Sorry, who had a powerful fleet, should have their thumbs cut off. It seemed to be beneficial, for Aegina was a threat to Piraeus because it was so near. But nothing cruel is in fact beneficial, for cruelty is extremely hostile to the nature of man, which we ought to follow. [00:20:33] Josh Bowman: Yeah, Machiavelli says. Yeah, but cruelty could be useful sometimes, especially if you do it all at once. Right. Make sure. Yeah, you know, you. Don't you. You still got those other four fingers. Aguina, or however you say that, that island's [00:20:45] Chris Anadale: name. Sorry, [00:20:47] Josh Bowman: I. I have no idea what the right. The right pronunciation is. And we're not going to let Catherine correct us because then we'll know if we're wrong or not. But I think this is one of the things I thought of after Catherine's comments last time was, you know, because you're right about the difference between a res publica and the state. Very important. I almost wonder if you could think of the state as a kind of conspiracy, right? In the sense that the modern state is a Cicero conspiracy, in the sense that it is the organization of kind of narrow interests just for the benefiting one another, because its basis is not in friendship or family or relationships the way Aristotelian or Ciceronian notion of the polis or the res publica is. In a sense, a state is essentially a conspiracy to. For. To benefit the few at the expense of the many, for the purpose of monopolizing power over a given area. Now, I don't want to take that so far. I think that that could be a fun conversation for later. But I do think this. I like this point he makes in public affairs. Wrong is very often done because of the appearance of benefit. I mean, this is politics 101, the amount. But what's striking to me, and this is true in ancient Rome, it's true in modern every country where there's. Well, of course this will benefit us. Right. Or this will be beneficial. Sometimes it's just, you're too stupid to realize that this will not benefit us. Right. This is true at the local level in many instances. Right, where they'll say, this will add jobs or this will add economic value, etc. No, you're just adding liability. You're adding more risks. You're actually adding all these things that will negate whatever benefit you think is going to come from this. Of course, the, the, the. And I think that's kind of what Cicero is getting at. In many instances, it's just flat ignorance. You didn't reason your way through this. Right. It seems beneficial to kill Caesar. Okay. But you didn't plan anything after that. You know, oops. So I, I think. I think he's. This is still a commentary on his own day, but it certainly is a commentary on ours as well. So. Catherine. [00:23:03] Katherine Bradshaw: Yeah, Josh, I'm gonna now have to go think about the conspiracy thing. I am very interested in this, but to, to not, not continue on that and to go on what we have here. The, the. The example of the Athenians is particularly powerful. I mean, so Athenian history is kind of rich with these examples of, of just things that seemed beneficial at the time and then were not. The. Reading Thucydides is like basically a long list of these because he's talking about the Peloponnesian War and the amendment of decisions like, yes, we should go attack Sicily while we still have the. Over here attacking us. That's a really good idea. No, it's not. But it seemed beneficial at the time. So this gets to the Roman attitude toward cruelty. And I think this is another area of confusion for. For modern readers, not, not so much of Cicero here, but particularly when the Roman. When reading Roman literature generally, is the difference between severity, which we talked about a while back with Cato, and cruelty, because the Romans considered severity severitas a virtue [00:24:26] Katherine Bradshaw: crudelitas cruelty a vice. So it's about why is one treating someone harshly and how. And so Cicero here is saying, well, the Athenians were being not just excessively harsh, but just nasty. There is a level and just. You don't do things. Cutting, ordering, the cutting off of everybody's thumbs is going against again, that community of man that Severitas doesn't Do that. Severitas is like, well, this is harsh, but it's good for the community, or it's good for you, or it's good for something. There's a reason behind it, as opposed to just, I just want to do something that's nasty and horrible or that I think is beneficial, but I don't really care about the fellowship of mankind. [00:25:17] Chris Anadale: Yeah, it seems we have very clearly the anti Machiavellian statement, nothing cruel. It looks beneficial, it's not ultimately beneficial. It will work against you because it violates the dignity of man, the fellowship of the human race, which is the foundation of all our actions and all of our behavior. I want to use my time here not to actually comment on this text, but to tell a joke because it lines up just too well. Schopenhauer, about whom I produce a lot of videos on my own channel, has a long passage where he talks at a couple different places about the nature of humor. And one of the stories he tells as an example of a certain type of humor actually plays off of this story about the two friends, one of who stands surety for the life of the other. And I just have to tell the joke here. Dionysius, the tyrant, decrees one of them must die. And so one goes away, the other one stands for his friend, puts his life on the line, and the other friend comes back, and the tyrant is so impressed, and he says, admit me as a third to your company of friendship. I would like to be a friend with as deep a bond as you have. The humor that Schopenhauer shares is that at a wedding, in congratulating the bride and the groom, a former boyfriend of the bride says to them, let me be a third in your fellowship. And this is the particular type of humor that plays exactly off of this story. The meaning is one thing at one level, but it conceals a meaning beneath it. So I just wanted to share that with you guys and with the rest of the audience. Our next passage is chapters 48. I'm sorry, 47 and 48. Josh, would you please read those? [00:27:00] Josh Bowman: I actually think I'm going to read through 47, 48, and 49. I think in the time. [00:27:05] Chris Anadale: Great. [00:27:09] Josh Bowman: They also act boldly, who prevent foreigners from enjoying their city and banish them. Pennis did this in our father's time, and Papias recently. It is right not to allow one who is not a citizen to act as a citizen. Those wisest of Consuls Crassus and Scaevola carried that law, however, to prevent foreigners from enjoying the City especially surely inhuman. Those cases are splendid in which the appearance of public benefit has been despised out of regard for honorableness. Our republic is full of such examples. On frequent other occasions, and especially during the Second Punic War, when the news of the disaster of Cannae was received, then Rome contained men of greater spirit than ever in times of success. No evidence of fear, no mention of peace. The force of the honorableness is so great that it eclipses the appearance of benefit. The Athenians, since they could not, however they tried withstand the Persian onslaught, decided to abandon the city, leaving their wives and children at Troezen and to put to sea and defend with their fleet the freedom of the Greeks. When a certain Sir Silius tried to persuade them to remain in the city and receive Xerxes, they stoned him to death. Yet he appeared to be pursuing a benefit, but there was none, as it was in conflict with the honorable. After the victory in the war with the Persians, Themistocles announced in the assembly that he had a plan which would preserve the nation. But it was necessary that it should not be common knowledge. He asked that the people should give him someone with whom he should share it. Aristides was chosen. Themistocles told him that the Spartan fleet which had been drawn ashore at Gythium and could secretly be set on fire. If that were done, the Spartan's power would inevitably be crushed. When Aristides heard this, he went into the assembly amid great expectation. He said that the counsel offered by Themistocles was extremely beneficial, but not at all honorable. The Athenians considered that something that was not honorable was not even beneficial. And on Aristides authority they rejected the plan completely, although they had not even heard it. They were better than us, for we let pirates go scot free while our allies pay tribute. Let this then remain fixed. If someone is dishonorable, it is never beneficial. Not even when you acquire something that you think beneficial. For the very act of thinking something dishonorable to be beneficial is a disastrous one. [00:29:42] Katherine Bradshaw: Oh, so much here. The example of Themistocles is interesting because Themistocles is not known for being the most honestus politician. He's most famous for tricking Xerxes into fighting at the battle of Salamis, the naval battle between the Persians and the Athenians, or the Greeks rather. But Aristides is is part of this story and he is known for being upright and just. I mean he was actually called the Just. That was his nickname. This is the guy who famously was helping someone who was illiterate right on the the Ostraca for the ostracism, for the banishment of someone. And he says who do you want written down? And the, the illiterate man says, well, I want Aristides written down. And this is Aristides he's talking to. He just doesn't know. And Aristides. And the man says, I don't know, I just am really tired of him being called the just. It's really annoying. And so Aristides says, ah, and then just writes his own name on the ostraca and puts it in the, in the, in the thing for the guy and is banished eventually. But he's so just that he'll. He'll still respect the process even though he. It's not for his own benefit. And so here the Athenians are actually more honorable, according to Cicero than the Romans because they don't even want to hear bad counsel. And as we saw in an earlier section, even to deliberate about a council that is dishonorable is itself dishonorable and wrong. Pace Machiavelli. But the odd thing is that Cicero keeps mentioning current circumstances and the pirate bit is a little bit of a political jab because his, he of course supported Pompey, and Pompey is known for cleaning up the Mediterranean pirate problem. And then after Pompey's death, and after Caesar's death, there was a rise in piracy again. And so this was something that Cicero's enemies were. It was an easy thing to sort of take a potshot at them for an illustration of a point, but also to make a political point of its own. [00:32:18] Chris Anadale: Yeah, I'm impressed in this passage by again the gap, the difference between our own assumptions about politics and Cicero's, where in chapter 47 here he praises the splendidness where the appearance of public benefit is despised out of regard for honorableness. People come together, say we could gain advantage by setting fire to the enemy fleet, but that would be shameful for us. This is sort of a sense of national honor and shame which overwhelms immediately any consideration of winning, of achieving the good, achieving the national interest by non beneficial, sorry, by dishonorable means. And of course, this is the same Cicero writing who approves of the murder of Caesar because it was beneficial to the republic, because it was a thing that needed to be done and had a certain kind of honorableness to it. But I think the tendency in our own time is to think so amorally about politics is to, unless we're trying to prove a point against an opponent, is to assume that we will do whatever is necessary to secure our interests, our national interest, even. And that consideration of honor would come later, if at all. So quite interesting to me here that for Cicero Row, the first gate you pass, the first box you check is, is this consistent with the honor of us collectively as a people? And if. If not, we don't do it, we reject it, we despise it, the way that the. The. The man of noble spirit despises mere. Mere benefit. [00:33:56] Josh Bowman: Yeah. And just building on that as. As we conclude here, I know we're kind of up on time, but, you know, this. This gets holden to the. And this is a kind of a dangerous thing to say because it's. It's in some ways Machiavellian, but, you know, is there such a thing as political morality that is distinctive to that realm, as it were, where, you know, does the end always justify the means? No. But maybe in politics, that's the best you can do. I know that's kind of a despairing, kind of dark way to put it, but I think, you know, you wonder to what extent is Cicero just being naive here, like, maybe you need to burn the Spartan ships. You know, is there. Is there an element in which sometimes you have to do the dishonorable thing because you don't want to lose? Because losing would be. You know, there's always these. These situations. You know, I'm not going to go through every single circumstance, right? The. The, you know, hiding the Jews during the, you know, the world, World War II, that. That kind of thing. I. I don't. I think Cicero would get that, but I do. I do think there's. It's. It's often more complicated. I just kind of want to leave that hanging for our listeners and viewers. You know, to. To what extent do we hold politics to a standard that it can never, ever achieve in an imperfect world where sinful people are responsible for a government over sinful people? I mean, that. That. That could be a kind of weird Christian Immachiavelli who's like, look, I believe in original sin, and it's everywhere, so we need to think about moral efficacy. Now, I think there's some clear responses to that saying, josh, you're a monster. But I also think it's an interesting conversation to have that Cicero provokes Cicero and Machiavelli and the juxtaposition of them provoked in us today, especially in our modern day, of wars upon wars and rumors of wars everywhere in particular. So with that, I believe, Chris, we're at the end, right? [00:35:55] Chris Anadale: Yes, that's right. [00:35:56] Josh Bowman: Excellent. Well, thank you so much for joining us. As a reminder, if there's another book of Cicero's that you want us to read through and talk about, please let us know in the comments. Share this show with your friends. And don't forget about our other show, the Sower, which is released every Sunday night on audio and on video, is released every Monday morning. Thank you so much for joining us and we'll see you next week.

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